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ABSTRACT—American criminal justice is in crisis, and most scholars agree
why: unduly severe laws, mass incarceration, and disproportionate effects on
minority groups. But they don’t agree on a solution. One group of scholars—
known as the “democratizers”—thinks the answer is to make the criminal
justice system more democratic. According to democratizers, layperson
participation and local democratic control will impart sensibility into
criminal justice reform. In short, a transfer of power away from distant
lawmakers and toward local communities, which would craft their own
criminal codes and elect their own prosecutors. This argument assumes that
more local means more democratic—but what if democratization actually
threatens democracy?
Criminal law could be made at the statewide level, the neighborhood
level, or somewhere in between. And that distinction matters. This Note
analyzes democratization through the lens of democratic theory, finding that
the degree to which the criminal lawmaking process is democratic depends
heavily on the unit of government at which it operates. In other words, the
critical variable is how local we go. Each level of government creates
tradeoffs between democratic principles. If criminal law is too localized, it
unfairly excludes voters from the political process and encourages localities
to compete in protectionist arms races. On the other hand, if criminal law
sweeps too broadly, then preferences vary too much among constituents for
the law to adequately represent any one community’s views. This Note
argues that “intermediate-level” institutions—counties or regions—are the
most democratically sound institutions to make and enforce criminal law.
These institutions, although imperfect, are best able to maximize
representation while still protecting against the destructive incentives of
microlocalism. Democratization can be more democratic, but only when it is
calibrated at the right level.
AUTHOR—J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021; B.A.,
University of Georgia, 2017. I am sincerely grateful to Professor Joshua
Kleinfeld for his endless feedback and encouragement. Many thanks also to
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INTRODUCTION
The American criminal justice system1 is in a dark moment. We punish
severely, 2 disproportionately so when it comes to minorities, 3 which has
1 The traditional view of the “criminal justice system includes law enforcement, prosecution, defense
services, the judiciary, and corrections.” Randolph N. Stone, Crisis in the Criminal Justice System,
8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 33, 33 (1991).
2 The incarceration rate in the United States is the highest in the world, despite comparatively low
crime rates. ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 2 (12th ed. 2018) (finding that the
United States incarcerated more than two million people out of its population of 320 million in 2018).
Another four and a half million were under some other form of correctional control, such as parole or
probation. DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at 2 (2018). Our uniquely high incarceration rate has persisted despite the
steady decline in crime rates since the 1990s. See MELISSA S. KEARNEY, BENJAMIN H. HARRIS, ELISA
JÁCOME & LUCIE PARKER, HAMILTON PROJECT, TEN ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT CRIME AND
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2014). In fact, the United States has only the fiftieth-highest
crime rate in the world. WORLD POPULATION REV., CRIME RATE BY COUNTRY 2021 (2021), https://
worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/crime-rate-by-country [https://perma.cc/9C5R-PU9Q].
The United States also tends to impose lengthier sentences than peer developed nations. JUST. POL’Y
INST., FINDING DIRECTION: EXPANDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS BY CONSIDERING POLICIES OF
OTHER NATIONS 2 (2011).
3 E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2016 5 tbl.3 (2018) (finding that one-third of
inmates are Black despite only 13% of the national population being Black). One in three Black males is
statistically likely to go to prison in his lifetime. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PREVALENCE
OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE UNITED STATES POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 1 (2003). Neither population
demographics, nor differential rates of offending, explain these differences. See NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH,
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fostered a lack of trust in law enforcement. 4 These issues, and the many
others plaguing the system,5 were laid bare by widespread protests against
police brutality during the summer of 2020 and beyond. 6 To no one’s
surprise, there is a near-universal appetite to alter our criminal justice
infrastructure.7 But there is nowhere near a consensus on how to do so, owing
largely to a disagreement over the right level of government to lead criminal
justice reform.8 This Note tries to identify that level.
In the debate over who should lead criminal justice reform, scholars
split into two broad camps: “democratizers” and “bureaucratic
professionalizers.” 9 Democratizers want to “democratize” the criminal
justice system by giving the voting public more control over reforms. In their
view, greater layperson control will inject sensibility into a removed and
unforgiving criminal justice machine.10 In practice, this includes reforms like
SENT’G PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE
POLICIES 20–22 (2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/race-and-punishment-racialperceptions-of-crime-and-support-for-punitive-policies/ [https://perma.cc/WP2J-HFHG].
4 NATHAN JAMES, KRISTIN FINKLEA, NATALIE KEEGAN, KAVYA SEKAR & RICHARD M. THOMPSON
II, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43904, PUBLIC TRUST AND LAW ENFORCEMENT—A DISCUSSION FOR POLICY
MAKERS 2 (2018) (finding that only 30% of Black survey respondents and 45% of Hispanic respondents
had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the police, compared to 61% of white respondents
(citing Jim Norman, Confidence in Police Back at Historical Average, GALLUP (July 10, 2017),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/213869/confidence-police-back-historical-average.aspx [https://perma.cc/
DYZ4-2R3K])).
5 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1370
(2017) (“The catalogue of dysfunction starts with mass incarceration, prison conditions, policing, and—
the site at which those three lines intersect—racial justice.”).
6 The murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and many others sparked worldwide protests
against police brutality in the summer of 2020. See Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A
Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-proteststimeline.html [https://perma.cc/4WSJ-DYB3]; Protests Across the Globe After George Floyd’s Death,
CNN WORLD (June 13, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/world/gallery/intl-georgefloyd-protests/index.html [https://perma.cc/S6W8-3ZSQ].
7 See, e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1374–75 (discussing how a wide range of academics, judges,
practitioners, and politicians agree that criminal justice is in a state of crisis). Indeed, “three-fourths of
Americans believe the country’s criminal justice system needs significant improvements.” Overwhelming
Majority of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, New Poll Finds, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Jan.
25, 2018), https://www.vera.org/blog/overwhelming-majority-of-americans-support-criminal-justicereform-new-poll-finds [https://perma.cc/WV4L-ZT3Q] (citing ROBERT BLIZZARD, PUB. OPINION
STRATEGIES, JUSTICE ACTION NETWORK, NATIONAL POLL RESULTS (Jan. 25, 2018), https://
www.politico.com/f/?id=00000161-2ccc-da2c-a963-efff82be0001 [https://perma.cc/9JV5-RJBF]).
8 See Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1375 (“[W]hen it comes to understanding why the system has
unraveled and how it could be set right . . . the consensus evaporates and in its place is what can seem
like a cacophony of conflicting voices.”).
9 Id. at 1377, 1399 (coining these terms).
10 The 2016 Northwestern University Law Review Symposium on Democratizing Criminal Law
featured many scholars who identify as democratizers. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Criminal Justice that
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plea bargaining juries, community policing, and vesting neighborhood or
city councils with the power to create substantive criminal law. 11 The
criminal justice system is broken, according to democratizers, because the
power to shape criminal law has shifted from voters to distant government
officials. Unlike local voters, who bear the effects of any changes, these
officials are incentivized to reduce crime regardless of the cost to individuals
and communities.12 The democratizers’ remedy is a dose of folk morality:
give the layperson a greater role in criminal justice decision-making—the
system should be responsive to us, not out-of-touch bureaucrats. 13
Bureaucratic professionalizers, or “bureaucratizers,” on the other hand,
argue that we should vest power in insulated experts who can make more
informed decisions than the public.14 The criminal justice system is broken,
according to bureaucratizers, because a vengeful public pressures its not-sodistant officials to crack down on crime.15
At the core of this debate is a disagreement over which institution
should create and implement criminal law through legislation, enforcement,

Revives Republican Democracy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1524 (2017) (arguing that restorative justice
can revive democracy by giving “direct voice” to those adversely affected in adjudications); R A Duff, A
Criminal Law We Can Call Our Own?, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1491, 1491–92 (2017) (sketching an “ideal”
of criminal law grounded in the republican theory of liberal democracy). For a greater discussion of
democratization and its proposals, see infra Section I.B.
11 Joshua Kleinfeld, Laura I. Appleman, Richard A. Bierschbach, Kenworthey Bilz, Josh Bowers,
John Braithwaite, Robert P. Burns, R A Duff, Albert W. Dzur, Thomas F. Geraghty, Adriaan Lanni,
Marah Stith McLeod, Janice Nadler, Anthony O’Rourke, Paul H. Robinson, Jonathan Simon, Jocelyn
Simonson, Tom R. Tyler & Ekow N. Yankah, White Paper of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U.
L. REV. 1693, 1697–1705 (2017) (listing thirty democratization proposals); see also infra notes 80–82
and accompanying text (discussing how states can delegate criminal lawmaking power to localities).
12 See Stephanos Bibas, Restoring Democratic Moral Judgment Within Bureaucratic Criminal
Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1678–79 (2017) (“The most fundamental problem with bureaucratic
criminal justice is that it has lost sight of why and how We the People should punish. Bureaucratization
breeds an intense concern for efficiency . . . . That is a recipe for ‘mass incarceration,’ not moral judgment
or public safety.”).
13 Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1397 (suggesting that criminal law should be “more value rational than
instrumentally rational” by responding “to public deliberation and to the values embedded in the way we
live together as a culture, rather than” to social-management concerns of institutional bureaucracies).
14 See, e.g., RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS
INCARCERATION 1–3, 168 (2019) (arguing that “[t]he average American citizen is not on equal footing
with an expert who studies the data in achieving these goals” and that, as a result, citizen choice would
be less accurate and based on emotion).
15 See, e.g., id. at 2 (“[W]e need to change the institutional framework we currently use to make
criminal justice policy. Instead of policies designed to appeal to the emotions of voters who lack basic
information about crime, we need to create an institutional structure that creates space for experts who
look at facts and data to set policies . . . .”); see also Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1376 (“[Bureaucratizers]
think the root of the present crisis is the outsized influence of the American public—a violent, vengeful,
stupid, uninformed, racist, indifferent, or otherwise wrongheaded American public—and the solution is
to place control over criminal justice in the hands of officials and experts.”).
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and adjudication.16 Yet democratizers have not established the contours of
which types of power would be transferred to whom.17 The implications of
who holds the keys to reform are far-reaching, not only for the elected
branches of state governments and the federal government—which would
cede power to local governments under the democratizers’ plan18—but also
for the judicial system. The Supreme Court, for instance, has even relaxed
Fourth Amendment standards because of the presence of civilian review.19
Given the implications of community-created laws, it is crucial to
ensure that these laws are the product of community choice—that
democratization is actually more democratic. Many democratizers assume
that more localized governance is more democratic. Such an argument is
intuitive: localized governments are likely more responsive to voters’ desires
because they represent a smaller subset of voters who likely have a more
homogenous set of preferences. 20 This Note challenges that assumption.
Local control could prove disastrous or a step in the right direction—the
critical variable is how local we go.
Other scholars have recently questioned democratization. In his
comprehensive critique, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal
Justice, Professor John Rappaport argues that democratization will not fix
the criminal justice system’s ills and it might even exacerbate them. 21
Professor Rappaport raises a catalogue of issues with the movement—such
as its faulty premise that community members have fungible preferences and
are thus better represented at the local level—and argues that the movement

16 See John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV.
711, 813 (2020) (“The critical questions are what values we want our criminal justice system to serve and
what kind of democracy is likeliest to realize them. The latter question . . . requires us to contemplate how
best to blend accountability to the public with various kinds of criminal justice expertise. These are
difficult questions that I put off for another day. But they are ones we should be asking.”).
17 See infra Section I.B (discussing the democratizers’ failure to define what community control
entails).
18 See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (discussing how states can delegate criminal
lawmaking power to localities).
19 In Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court considered whether the police’s failure to knock and
announce their presence before a search implicated the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule—a
doctrine that prohibits the inclusion of illegally obtained evidence at trial. 547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006). The
Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule, reasoning that the community itself could hold police
accountable, thus reducing the need for the exclusionary rule. According to the Court, in a prediction that
did not age well, “the increasing use of various forms of citizen review can enhance [police]
accountability,” and so police have little incentive to commit these violations in the first place. Id. at 599.
20 See David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 768 (describing the
widely held view that more localized governments are more responsive to voters).
21 Rappaport, supra note 16, at 758.
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would create more severe criminal law, among other negative externalities.22
In addition, Elizabeth Janszky canvassed democratization scholarship and
identified a subset of democratizers she termed “localizers.” Localizers, the
focus of this Note, want to place power in the hands of local communities in
particular, rather than increase public participation more generally.23 Like
Professor Rappaport, Janszky argues that localizing criminal justice leads to
representational problems because of the lack of political institutions at the
local level, low voter-turnout rates, and high barriers to entry into local
political processes.24
Although previous scholarship touches on the representation and
accountability concerns created by democratization, it does not offer a
comprehensive treatment of those issues. This Note fills that void by making
two main contributions, one narrower and one broader than previous work.
First, this Note is narrower than previous scholarship because it zeroes
in on the representation and accountability issues produced by
democratization, rather than providing a broad critique of democratization’s
externalities. This Note examines the democratization movement through the
lens of democratic theory and asks whether democratization is actually more
democratic. Fundamental to any theory of democracy is the principle that the
people make basic normative policy choices.25 Political legitimacy therefore
22 Id. at 719, 739–50, 775 (“A growing comparative literature investigates the determinants of penal
policies. Nearly all of it suggests that populism makes criminal justice more, not less, severe.”). For
example, one review of these types of studies comparing many countries found that “a populist view that
criminal justice policy should be strongly influenced by public sentiment and partisan politics” was a
notable risk factor of a more punitive criminal system. Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies,
36 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (2007). “[A] predominate view that criminal justice policy falls appropriately
within the province of expert knowledge and professional experience,” on the other hand, was a protective
factor against such a system. Id.
An externality is an economic term for when the benefit (in the case of a positive externality) or a
cost (a negative externality) of an action or transaction impacts an uninvolved third party. See, e.g.,
Thomas Helbling, Externalities: Prices Do Not Capture All Costs, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Feb. 24,
2020), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/external.htm [https://perma.cc/875A-QD8H]
(“In the case of pollution—the traditional example of a negative externality—a polluter makes decisions
based only on the direct cost of and profit opportunity from production and does not consider the indirect
costs to those harmed by the pollution.”). The negative externalities this Note is concerned with are the
negative effects of one locality’s choices about criminal justice policy on other localities.
23 See Elizabeth G. Janszky, Note, Defining “Local” in a Localized Criminal Justice System,
94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1318, 1320 (2019) (“Unlike some democratizers, who care primarily about increasing
public participation in the criminal system through a variety of means, localizers specifically want to push
power down into the hands of the ‘local community.’”); see also infra Section I.B (discussing the
definition of “community”).
24 Janszky, supra note 23, at 1337–40.
25 Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An
“Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 761–62 (1989) (“[A] fundamentally democratic
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depends “primarily on who is to make fundamental policy judgments, rather
than on what those decisions ultimately are.”26 The most important quality in
a democratic system is, in other words, self-determination. 27 This Note
analyzes democratization through a democratic lens, asking to what extent it
allows for self-determination in the criminal justice system.
Second, this Note is broader than previous scholarship because it goes
beyond existing democratization proposals to consider a larger question
underlying the criminal justice debate: what is the right-sized institution to
make and enforce criminal law? This Note analyzes the democratic
implications of criminal lawmaking at three levels of government—
neighborhood, intermediate (regional or county), and state or federal—and
argues that intermediate institutions are the most democratic institutions to
lead criminal justice reform. 28 Previous scholarship assumes a false
dichotomy: lawmaking and enforcement decisions can occur at either a
broad, statewide or nationwide level or at a hyperlocal level.29 But there is a
wider range of possibilities. Rather than treating democratization as either

society assumes as its ultimate normative political premise some notion of self-determination, if only
indirectly through a representational structure.”). This idea is supported in the historical and political
literature. Tocqueville, for example, stated that “the principle of the sovereignty of the people has
acquired, in the United States, all the practical development which the imagination can conceive.” ALEXIS
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 51 (Henry Reeve trans., New York, George Adlard 3d Am.
ed. 1839) (“Whenever the political laws of the United States are to be discussed, it is with the doctrine of
the sovereignty of the people that we must begin . . . . In America, the principle of the sovereignty of the
people is not either barren or concealed . . . it is recognized by the customs and proclaimed by the
laws . . . .”); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 9 (1960) (“Governments . . . derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. If
that consent be lacking, governments have no just powers.”).
26 Redish, supra note 25, at 762.
27 Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function,
94 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (1984) (“The essential element of any democratic society is at least some level of
majoritarian self-determination.”); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 9
(1982) (“We in the United States are philosophically committed to the political principle that
governmental policymaking . . . ought to be subject to control by persons accountable to the electorate.”
(emphasis added)). Self-determination is even a goal of the democratization movement itself. See, e.g.,
Kleinfeld et al., supra note 11, at 1697 (“Rules, standards, and institutional practices that violate
community views of justice . . . should be eliminated from criminal law and procedure unless . . . [they]
are the only means of promoting an[other] interest that the community agrees to be more important . . . .”).
28 The category in which a municipal government falls varies depending on the municipality’s size,
thus making municipal governments difficult to classify. In smaller cities, municipal governments exhibit
many of the characteristics of neighborhood governments. See infra Section II.B (discussing
neighborhood-level governance). Larger city governments may be closer to intermediate institutions, but
they still lack the ability to capture transient populaces in the way that regional or county governments
often can. See infra Part III (discussing intermediate-level governance).
29 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 16, at 745 (“[T]he democratizers tend to focus on the microlocal.
Theirs is a theory of neighborhoods, not cities.”).
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local or nonlocal, we must consider how democratization affects democratic
principles across a spectrum of localization.30
This Note therefore offers a friendly critique to both democratizers and
bureaucratizers. To democratizers, it suggests a way forward—intermediate
institutions—that is consistent with their underlying motivation of returning
power to the people. But it also offers a warning: if democratization is not
calibrated appropriately, democratization will undermine itself. To
bureaucratizers, this Note suggests that their critiques unfairly assume
democratization is a fundamentally narrow proposal. Democratization can
occur in varying degrees and at varying levels. By focusing on hyperlocal or
hyperbroad extremes, bureaucratizers ignore the benefits of a potential
compromise. To be sure, this Note only identifies the “right” institution from
the perspective of democratic representation and accountability. As
bureaucratizers point out, factors beyond the scope of this purely democratic
inquiry should also weigh in the calculus—such as the expertise available to
each institution or the ability of law enforcement to operate in various
jurisdictions with different laws.31 The most democratic institution may not,
at the end of the day, be the most desirable.32 But because democracy is a
fundamental part of our political system, if we sacrifice democratic ideals to
achieve other goals, we should at least be aware that we are doing so.
Part I begins with an overview of the democratization movement. It
considers the theoretical underpinnings of localization and reviews existing
democratization proposals, pointing out that “community” lacks a stable
definition in the existing literature. Parts II and III then measure democracy
at three levels of government using the three factors most critical to selfdetermination in criminal lawmaking: (1) maximization of policy
preferences, (2) inclusion of voters active in the community, and
(3) displacement and diffusion. Part II considers control over criminal justice
at the two levels already considered in previous scholarship—neighborhood
and state or federal—and catalogues the problems inherent in each. Part III
considers control over criminal justice at the intermediate level, including
Cf. Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1399 (“[D]emocracy is a ‘more or less,’ not an ‘either/or’ concept.”).
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 14, at 3 (suggesting that insulated administrative officials should
lead criminal justice reform because experts are better informed and more rational); cf. Brandon L.
Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1493–94 (2018) (discussing
how decision-makers have begun relying more on evidence-based methods to improve policing, public
safety, and the quality of evidence in courtrooms, as well as to reduce incarceration).
32 The word “democracy,” of course, is imbued with powerful rhetorical force. See Rappaport, supra
note 16, at 716. In reality, our political system is full of compromises between democracy and other
values. The very first words of our Constitution after the preamble sacrifice some democracy for some
expertise. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1–6 (creating a representative, rather than a direct, democracy). So
while this Note informs an important aspect of the criminal justice reform debate, it does not claim to
settle that debate.
30
31
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regional governance, which covers a city and its suburbs, and county
governance. 33 The three self-determination factors show that the
intermediate level—the least explored level to date—is the most democratic
vehicle for criminal justice reform.
I.

WHAT IS COMMUNITY CONTROL?

Despite its prevalence in democratization literature, the term
“community” lacks a stable definition. Democratizers sometimes use the
term to refer to a neighborhood, sometimes a city, and sometimes without
respect to a unit of government.34 But defining community is vital to any
discussion of democratization because the term implicates democratic
principles in different ways, depending on its scope. In general, communitybased democratization proposals seek to place lawmaking and enforcement
power in the hands of some community smaller than a state.35 While not all
democratization scholarship is community based, the transfer of power to
local communities is a large part of the democratization agenda.36 In line with
previous scholarship, this Note refers to community-based democratizers as
“localizers.”37
This Part first discusses the history of community-based
democratization and then dissects democratization and its proposals in
greater detail, ultimately identifying a common problem: community is
seldom defined.
A. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Community-Based Criminal Law
While democratization and bureaucratic professionalism are new terms,
their debate has old roots. The origins of community-based democratization
are arguably as old as the nation itself. Thomas Jefferson championed
33

See infra Part III (discussing intermediate-level governance).
See infra Section I.B. Part of the problem is that “community” is simply difficult to define. Even
the dictionary definition of “community” is ambiguous about how a community relates to its surrounding
geographic area. See Community, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
community [https://perma.cc/N9JZ-KYNW] (defining “community” as “a unified body of individuals:
such as . . . [a group of] . . . people with common interests living in a particular area”).
35 See Rappaport, supra note 16, at 729 (“The concept of ‘community’ is central to the
democratization agenda.”).
36 Recall that Janszky defines localizers—those who want to return political power to the community
level—as only a subgroup of the larger democratization movement. See Janszky, supra note 23, at 1320.
Indeed, some democratizers are not concerned with local community control. See, e.g., Josh Bowers &
Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of
Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 216–19, 233–34 (2012) (suggesting
that moral credibility be defined at the statewide level and that legitimacy should arguably be evaluated
at a smaller jurisdictional level—although doing so may not be possible).
37 See Janszky, supra note 23, at 1320.
34
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“localized, small-scale participatory governance in ‘little republics,’”38 while
James Madison criticized localism on the grounds that it would lead to a
tyranny of the majority. According to Madison, without the check of multiple
competing factions, which is less likely in a smaller-scale government, a
dominant group would oppress the minority.39
If Thomas Jefferson is the intellectual grandfather of democratization,
then Professor Bill Stuntz is its father.40 Professor Stuntz, who would today
be considered a localizer, desired a return to the Gilded Age—the late 1870s
to 1929—a time he believed contained “the most egalitarian criminal justice
in American history,”41 at least outside of the Jim Crow South, where Black
people were victimized in an anarchic and authoritarian social order.42 This
period was egalitarian, according to Professor Stuntz, because the “system
was both more localized and more democratic.”43 Criminal justice decisionmaking power was vested in local jurors, local politicians, and in voters from
the neighborhoods where crime was concentrated. 44 For example, police
chiefs and prosecutors were selected on a citywide basis during the Gilded
Age, a time when the big-city machines often determined local nominations.
Those machines, in turn, depended “on the votes of the working-class
immigrants whose streets most needed patrolling”—making police and
prosecutors beholden to the people they were policing and prosecuting. 45
Local communities thus wielded substantially more control than they do
today—at least until the Great Migration, in which Black people
concentrated in poor urban neighborhoods and white people fled to suburbs.
Despite migrating to the suburbs, white people still held more political power
over urban criminal justice because prosecutors and judges were elected at

38 Wayne A. Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, 93 IND. L.J. 369, 370 (2018) (quoting Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, RETIREMENT
SERIES, MARCH TO NOVEMBER 1813, at 562–68 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2010)).
39 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that one
dominant faction, which is more likely in small democratic units, would lead to oppression).
40 See Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1403 (identifying Professor Stuntz as a “founding father of the
democratization point of view”).
41 William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1975 (2008). But see Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045,
1055 (2013) (arguing that minority communities outside the South were not policed by “their own” and
often mistrusted police by the end of the Gilded Age).
42 Stuntz, supra note 41, at 1983–85.
43 Id. at 1975.
44 Id. (“In the past, local democratic control of criminal justice appears to have produced equality
and lenity.”).
45 Id. at 1995.
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the county level. 46 But because suburban whites enjoyed historically low
crime rates, they largely stayed out of criminal justice issues.47 As a result,
from the 1930s onwards, power drifted away from the voters and to distant
“professionals and experts”—technocrats not directly elected by the
people—which “changed the justice system almost entirely for the worse.”48
If only those in urban neighborhoods where crime rates are highest had the
ability to control those who govern them, Professor Stuntz argued, criminal
justice would return to the fairer ways of the Gilded Age.49
Like Professor Stuntz, localizers today think that government functions
better when it is responsive to a smaller area with fewer people. Localizers
offer five main justifications for such a system. 50 First, localism gives a
layperson a greater degree of relative autonomy over political outcomes.51
Second, local jurisdictions narrowly tailor laws to the needs and interests of
a community.52 Third, people can “vote with their feet” and move to the
community that best aligns with their values.53 Fourth, localized government
increases public participation in the political system. 54 Lastly, localism

46 See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7 (2011). Counties
grew to contain populous suburbs, granting these suburbs a greater share of the voting power than innercity neighborhoods. See Stuntz, supra note 41, at 1995.
47 STUNTZ, supra note 46, at 7, 35.
48 Id. at 193–94.
49 Stuntz, supra note 41, at 2040 (“[T]he key to a more egalitarian [criminal] justice system is greater
local control.”); see also id. at 1986–87 (emphasizing a study which found that Black murder defendants
fared about as well as white murder defendants in Philadelphia during the Gilded Age).
50 In the localism literature, the first three justifications are distinct but generally considered under
the umbrella term of “efficiency.” See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Symposium, Localism and Regionalism,
48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (2000) (categorizing the advantages of localism).
51 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 444 (1990) (arguing that when government operates at a local level, decision-makers are primarily
concerned with the interests of local residents).
52 See Briffault, supra note 50, at 15 (“[L]ocal autonomy permits public policy decisions to match
distinctive local conditions. If all political decisions were taken at a highly centralized level, it would be
difficult to vary policies in light of diverse local needs and preferences.”); see also Logan, supra note 38,
at 375 (“To advocates, a chief virtue of localism lies in its capacity to tailor constitutional norms to local
needs and preferences, resulting in a possible broadening of constitutional protection.”).
53 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (“[At
the local level,] the consumer-voter moves to that community whose local government best satisfies his
set of preferences.”). This reasoning, however, is flawed—many people do not, and often cannot, move
solely because of political ideology. See Richard C. Schragger, Federalism, Metropolitanism, and the
Problem of States, 105 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1548–51, 1557 (2019).
54 See Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 182 (2016)
(“Localism purportedly increases citizen participation because the small size of local governments affords
people opportunity for the exercise of genuine power and decision making. This, in turn, creates more of
an incentive for citizens to participate in their own governance.”).
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encourages localities to experiment with policies, which increases
innovation.55
In sum, the call of localism is clear when framed relative to larger scale
governance: align the incentives of the criminal system with those of local
communities and not with those of states or nations.
B. Community-Based Proposals and Their Definitional Problem
Less clear, however, is what localism means in an absolute sense
because scholars have struggled to define what exactly constitutes a local
community and, in turn, at which level we should localize to capture the will
of that community. The lack of a stable definition for “community” presents
a foundational limitation for democratizers because democratization relies
heavily on the idea of community preferences.56 Janszky defines localizers
as those who have “a preference for decentralized, small, local government
structures, usually at the municipal level.”57 But that could include anything
from a small neighborhood to a major city or county.58 This Section explores
the democratizers’ proposals in an attempt to determine what “community”
means: would democratizers vest power in neighborhoods, cities, or some
other unit of governance?59
The blueprint Professor Stuntz laid out for democratization seems, at
first glance, to be a directive for self-governance at the neighborhood level.60
While modern democratizers also urge localization, their proposals do not
always tell us at which level to localize. Even when democratizers do suggest
a level, they often reach different conclusions or provide unclear definitions.
55

Logan, supra note 38, at 375 (“Another potential benefit of localism is that it holds promise of
beneficial experimentation, akin to that envisioned by Justice Brandeis . . . .”). Justice Louis D. Brandeis
envisioned states having more freedom to engage in social and economic experimentation. See New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
56 See Rappaport, supra note 16, at 729 (“The concept of ‘community’ is central to the
democratization agenda.”).
57 Janszky, supra note 23, at 1326.
58 Arizona’s Maricopa County, for example, has 4.4 million residents, making it larger than many
states. See Maricopa County Quick Facts, MARICOPA CNTY., https://www.maricopa.gov/3598/CountyQuick-Facts [https://perma.cc/7NZB-5YR6].
59 See Janszky, supra note 23, at 1332–33 (“Based on what localizers critique in their scholarship,
we know what ‘local community’ is not—it is not bureaucracies, state governments, or the federal
government—but aside from that, it is unclear whether localizers are referring to neighborhoods,
precincts, cities, or counties.”).
60 See Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 1080 (“More central to Stuntz’s book, however, is its ambition
to restore political power to local neighborhoods.”). But as Professor Stephen Schulhofer points out,
Professor Stuntz does not explain how power should be given back to the community. The closest
Professor Stuntz comes is proposing that we draw juries from neighborhoods where crime happens.
Otherwise, Professor Stuntz proposed leaving decision-making power in the same place: with actors, such
as district attorneys and judges, who are elected on a citywide or countywide basis. Id. at 1080–81.
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Most notably, a large group of democratizers wrote a white paper
proposing criminal justice reforms.61 They argue that criminal justice should
be more “community-focused and responsive to lay influences,” 62 and
twenty-two of their thirty proposals hinge on community views to some
extent. 63 For example, they suggest decriminalizing crimes that are not
considered wrongful according to “community views of justice,”64 creating
citizen advisory boards that would draw members from the community to
advise legislators and police,65 and redrawing prosecutorial districts to make
prosecutors “responsive to smaller and more cohesive communities.” 66
Despite relying on the idea of community, the white paper does not define
what a community is, whom a community includes, or which values a
community holds. It does not explain, for example, whose views we should
consult in decriminalizing offenses or which type of locality we should draw
prosecutorial districts around.
Some democratization literature has admittedly proposed solutions that
include a definition of the community at issue. After suggesting that
“localities” make greater use of criminal laws, Professor Lauren Ouziel
identifies localities as cities. She then offers two lawmaking avenues: a city
could craft criminal ordinances itself, or a state could create criminal laws
that apply only to certain cities. 67 By contrast, Professor Christopher
Slobogin defines communities as neighborhoods and proposes that
neighborhood councils should approve surveillance systems before they are
installed in a neighborhood.68
For the most part, however, the suggested unit of governance is unclear.
For example, Professor Richard Bierschbach proposes “[p]ushing more
criminal justice power—legislative, enforcement, adjudicative, and penal—
down to directly affected communities and neighborhoods” before
suggesting that “[c]ity councils . . . be given real power to craft their own

61

See Kleinfeld et al., supra note 11, at 1697–1705.
Id. at 1694 (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 1697–1705. Eighteen proposals explicitly reference the “community.” Four more
proposals—pertaining to grand juries, equitable trial juries, and sentencing juries—are explained in an
earlier proposal to incorporate community viewpoints. Id. at 1697 (“All juries, including grand, trial, and
sentencing juries, should be drawn from within the immediate, local community in which the crime was
committed . . . .”).
64 Id. at 1698.
65 Id. at 1699–1700.
66 Id. at 1702.
67 Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE L.J. 2236,
2323–24 (2014) (“With respect to lawmaking, localities should consider more robust use of local laws.”).
68 Christopher Slobogin, Community Control over Camera Surveillance: A Response to Bennett
Capers’s Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 993, 996–97 (2013).
62
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substantive criminal codes.” 69 He does not explain whether both
neighborhoods and cities should exercise legislative power, whether these
proposals are mutually exclusive, or whether cities should create laws that
apply uniquely to certain neighborhoods. The answers to such questions raise
important implications for major cities, where the differences between
neighborhood and municipal control are sizable. In a different article,
Professor Bierschbach and then-Professor Stephanos Bibas support
community control at the county level. They do so by defending the
California Public Safety Realignment Act, which transferred inmates from
the state prison system to county jails and gave counties discretion—over
both incarceration and parole—to craft policies according to their “local
priorities, preferences, and needs.”70
Relatedly, Professor Laura Appleman advocates for community
prosecution, community courts, and community policing.71 Under Professor
Appleman’s plan, prosecutors would be assigned to, but not elected by,
specific neighborhoods. Yet Professor Appleman does not define the level at
which community policing would operate, only stating that it should
“establish partnerships” with local residents.72
Lastly, some democratizers even argue that courts should afford
constitutional deference to locally crafted laws. 73 In City of Chicago v.
Morales, the Supreme Court struck down an antiloitering ordinance that the
City of Chicago enacted to combat gang crime, finding the ordinance
unconstitutionally vague. 74 “The ordinance was to be enforced only after
consultation with ‘local leaders’ and ‘community organizations,’” something
that Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares think is crucial.75 They argue
69 Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of Punishment,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1452 (2017) (emphasis added).
70 Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing Equality?, 102 VA.
L. REV. 1447, 1503–07 (2016).
71 Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in the Criminal
System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1529–33 (2016).
72 Id. Professor Appleman’s proposal might allow prosecutors and judges to tailor their actions to a
community, but if judges are appointed or elected on a statewide level, the proposal may not necessarily
increase community control.
73 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1184 (1998) (arguing that judges should evaluate community policing
under relaxed scrutiny “when they are confident that the political community has meaningfully
internalized the burden that such policing puts on individual liberty”).
74
527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (“In our judgment . . . the ordinance does not provide sufficiently specific
limits on the enforcement discretion of the police ‘to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and
clarity.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 64 (Ill. 1997))).
75 See Kahan & Meares, supra note 73, at 1183 (“Enforcement of the ordinance was implemented
through regulations that clearly specified who counted as a ‘gang member,’ what kinds of behavior
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that because the ordinary citizen’s “decisions about the appropriate balance
between liberty and order” deserve respect, the Court should have granted
deference to community views when evaluating the ordinance.76 The Court
never addressed that argument, but there is some evidence the Justices might
be open to revisiting the issue. Six years after Morales, in Hudson v.
Michigan, the Court applied a relaxed standard of the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule—a doctrine that prohibits the inclusion of illegally
obtained evidence at trial.77 The Court held that the police’s failure to knock
and announce their presence did not mandate the suppression of all evidence
obtained in their search, in part because of “evidence that the increasing use
of various forms of citizen review can enhance police accountability,” which
apparently reduces the likelihood that police will violate the Amendment.78
In sum, although many scholars call for localized criminal law, they
have not reached a consensus on the appropriate level of localization. A
survey of the literature reveals proposals ranging from the neighborhood
level to the county level. The democratizers have a clear aim in a relative
sense—government smaller than the state or federal level—but not in an
absolute sense. The choice over which level to localize at, however, has
dangerous implications for democracy.
II. MEASURING DEMOCRACY
Despite their calls for community-based lawmaking and enforcement,
democratizers have not identified the level of government in which
lawmaking and enforcement decisions should be made. But this choice is
critical to the amount of representation and accountability accompanying
criminal justice reform. To operationalize this inquiry into which political
institution optimizes representation and accountability, Parts II and III
examine the democratic implications of criminal lawmaking and
enforcement at three levels of government: neighborhood, county or region,
and state or federal. There is no panacea, as each institution creates unique
tradeoffs between certain democratic values, but some institutions are more
democratic than others. If we were to assign a hypothetical democracy score
to each level of government, the intermediate level—county and regional
governments—would earn the highest score.
Two things constrain the scope of this analysis. First, this Note
examines each level of government only through the perspective of
counted as ‘loitering,’ which officers could enforce the law, and in what neighborhood areas it could be
enforced.”).
76 Id.
77 547 U.S. 586, 597, 599 (2006).
78 Id. at 599.
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democratic representation and accountability. There are sound arguments for
and against localization that are beyond this basic democratic inquiry. 79
Take, for instance, the possibility of discrimination. This Note concludes that
county or regional legislatures are the most democratic institutions, but a
shift to these institutions could have serious implications for racial minorities
in majority-white areas. Recall that Professor Stuntz praised the Gilded Age
as the most egalitarian time in U.S. history outside the South—but what
about the South? A localized criminal justice system can pose serious
discrimination risks, which should not be ignored. This Note focuses only on
democracy—an important, but not dispositive, factor in criminal justice
reform.
Second, the Constitution vests most criminal lawmaking authority in
the states by virtue of their police powers.80 States can delegate that power to
localities, but localities have only the powers granted to them by the state
under state constitutional “home rule.”81 So even if, as a normative matter, a
locality should exercise criminal lawmaking and enforcement powers, it may
still lack such powers. Some state constitutions even explicitly prohibit
delegating criminal lawmaking powers to local government, 82 although
localities may be able to functionally modify state law through
nonenforcement.83 The practical realities presented by each state constitution
are beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note asks if there is an ideal
institution from the standpoint of democratic representation. That answer
should then inform our judgments of these state constitutional provisions.
79 For example, bureaucratizers would heavily value the level of expertise available to lawmakers at
each level of government. See, e.g., BARKOW, supra note 14, at 1–3, 168 (arguing that experts arrive at
more accurate decisions than laypeople).
80 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving for the states “powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution”); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000) (“[T]here is no better
example of the police power . . . than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”).
81 Shawn E. Fields, Second Amendment Sanctuaries, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 468 (2020) (“[A local
government’s] power is traditionally limited to those specifically enumerated in its respective state
constitution . . . . These limited powers . . . are often referred to as ‘home rule’ powers.”). This
relationship functions much like the inverse of the states’ relationship with the federal government. There,
the federal government has a limited set of enumerated powers, with the rest reserved for the states and
the people. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1990–91 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(describing federalism principles). But here, states have general police powers, with only a set of
enumerated powers reserved to localities in their state constitutions. Fields, supra, at 468.
82 See, e.g., JOHN MARTINEZ, 1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 4:7, Westlaw (database updated May
2021) (noting that the South Dakota Constitution, for example, “gives local governments general power
to legislate on any subject except private relationships and criminal laws”).
83 Much as how “sanctuary cities” resist federal immigration laws, some localities are refusing to
enforce state gun-control measures. See Christopher N. Lasch, R. Linus Chan, Ingrid V. Eagly, Dina
Francesca Haynes, Annie Lai, Elizabeth M. McCormick & Juliet P. Stumpf, Understanding “Sanctuary
Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1710–11 (2018); Fields, supra note 81, at 485–89 (describing how some
localities could resist state gun-control laws through nonenforcement).
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Section II.A identifies and defines three factors that measure the
democratic credentials of criminal law institutions. Section II.B then applies
these factors to neighborhood institutions, and Section II.C applies them to
state or federal institutions.
A. Defining the Three Factors of Democratic Representation
To assess the democratic strength of each level of government, we need
tools that measure democratic principles in a criminal law context. Selfdetermination—the idea that voters should exercise control over the laws that
affect them—begs two fundamental questions. First, can voters control
which laws are enacted by electing candidates who share their preferences?
Second, are the voters affected by those laws? This Note operationalizes
these questions into three factors: (1) preference maximization, (2) inclusion,
and (3) displacement and diffusion.84 These factors have never before been
applied to a democratic inquiry into criminal law, but they derive from the
localist and regionalist literatures, which have long recognized their value.85
Each factor contributes to “allocational efficiency,” in which districts are
drawn so that the political process best represents as many people as it can.86
In turn, this Note assumes that the most democratically sound institution to
make and enforce criminal law is the institution that best optimizes these
factors.
First, “preference maximization” refers to the idea that voters are better
represented when jurisdictions group together like-minded voters. This
factor measures the likelihood that voters can control which laws are
enacted. If we draw districts around people who tend to agree, then districts
can more easily maximize the policy preferences of their voters.87 Suppose
three jurisdictions each want to take a different approach to criminal justice.
If laws are made at a centralized level governing all three, then two outcomes
are possible: the preferences of one jurisdiction will win out to the detriment
of the other two jurisdictions, or the centralized government will reach a
compromise that only partially satisfies each jurisdiction. In either scenario,
two or all three of the jurisdictions will not be completely satisfied with the
outcome. But if each jurisdiction can instead make its own laws, then each
84

While there are undoubtably other factors that measure how democratic an institution is, such as
interest-group influence, I believe these factors measure the most fundamental elements of selfdetermination in criminal law. Throughout this Note, I sometimes refer to the third factor only as
displacement for concision.
85 See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
86 See Briffault, supra note 50, at 15–16.
87 See Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State–Local Relationship?,
106 GEO L.J. 1469, 1491 (2018); see also Briffault, supra note 50, at 15 (arguing that decentralization
allows local governments to tailor laws to the needs of their voters).

577

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

can pass laws tailored to its own preferences. Of course, democracy always
produces winners and losers—some voters will still find themselves in the
minority, no matter how efficiently we draw districts. 88 But preference
maximization measures whether a democratic structure is producing the
most winners possible.
Second, “inclusion” stands for the idea that those who have an interest
in a jurisdiction’s criminal laws should be able to vote for the officials that
enact and enforce those laws. In other words, inclusion measures whether
voters have a say in the laws that affect them.89 For example, if a voter spends
significant time in a jurisdiction or owns property in a jurisdiction, inclusion
might suggest that she should have a vote in that jurisdiction, even if she is
not formally a resident there.
Third, “displacement” addresses the idea that criminal behavior is not
static. Like inclusion, this factor measures whether voters have a say in the
laws that affect them, but from a different perspective—namely, that
attempts to address crime in one jurisdiction can have spillover effects in
neighboring jurisdictions that the neighboring voters never voted for. 90
People engage, at least in part, in a cost–benefit analysis when deciding
whether to commit a crime.91 One jurisdiction raising the costs of committing
a crime—by increasing the probability of detection or the severity of the
expected sanction—might deter a person from committing crime in that
jurisdiction. This makes nearby jurisdictions that have not imposed similar
costs relatively more attractive destinations for criminal activity.92 Research

88 See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 (1977) (“Some
candidate, along with his supporters, always loses.”).
89 Inclusion naturally follows from the premise that the people should make basic normative policy
choices because to make such choices, people must be able to vote on the policies affecting them. See
Redish, supra note 25, at 762–64.
90 Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional
Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1839 (2005) (“[J]urisdictions may shift criminal activity to
neighboring jurisdictions . . . by affecting the ex ante decision about where to commit certain crimes.”).
The type of displacement at issue here is known as spatial displacement, meaning that offenders switch
from targets in one location to targets in another location. Other types of displacement, such as target
displacement (offenders change from one type of target to another) and temporal displacement (offenders
change the time at which they commit the crime) also exist but are not relevant here. See ROB T.
GUERETTE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF CMTY.-ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., ANALYZING CRIME
DISPLACEMENT AND DIFFUSION 3 (2009).
91 Teichman, supra note 90, at 1829.
92 See id. at 1839–40.
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has shown this pattern with respect to robbery93 and prostitution,94 although
displacement does not always occur after the costs of committing crime
increase.95
Social scientists have also observed the opposite effect, known as
“diffusion.” Diffusion is the reduction of crime in one nearby area because
of a targeted response in another—what one neighborhood does about crime
can deter criminal activity in other neighborhoods.96 Even though diffusion
appears to provide a benefit to neighboring voters, both displacement and
diffusion conflict with self-determination.97 Displacement does so because
voters experience higher crime in their jurisdiction as a result of criminal
justice policies for which they did not vote. Diffusion, though seemingly a
positive byproduct, also harms self-determination because it strips voters in
the affected jurisdiction of the right to calibrate their own criminalpunishment regime. Lower crime rates carry a cost, and the affected
jurisdiction might not want to lower crime rates at the cost of harsher
penalties and locking up its own.98
In sum, three factors—preference maximization, inclusion, and
displacement and diffusion—best measure the democratic credentials of
criminal lawmaking and enforcement institutions. The rest of Part II and Part
III apply these factors to three broad levels of government and reveal that
intermediate institutions best handle the representational tradeoffs made in
criminal lawmaking and enforcement.

93

See Christian Grandjean, Bank Robberies and Physical Security in Switzerland: A Case Study of
the Escalation and Displacement Phenomena, 1 SEC. J. 155, 157–58 (1990). But see Anthony A. Braga,
David L. Weisburd, Elin J. Waring, Lorraine Green Mazerolle, William Spelman & Francis Gajewski,
Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment,
37 CRIMINOLOGY 541, 567–69 (1999) (finding problem-oriented policing interventions do not lead to
displacement of robbery calls and incidents).
94 Phil Hubbard, Community Action and the Displacement of Street Prostitution: Evidence from
British Cities, 29 GEOFORUM 269, 278–80 (1998).
95 Some studies found “considerable evidence of spatial displacement . . . as a result of police
crackdowns, especially during drug enforcement.” Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The Limits of Hot Spot
Policing, in POLICE INNOVATION: CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES 252–53 (David Weisburd & Anthony A.
Braga eds., 2006). But a comprehensive review found displacement only in 23% percent of instances.
Rob T. Guerette & Kate J. Bowers, Assessing the Extent of Crime Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits:
A Review of Situational Crime Prevention Evaluations, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1331, 1346–47 (2009).
96 The same comprehensive review that found displacement in nearly one-quarter of instances found
diffusion in 37% percent of instances. Guerette & Bowers, supra note 95, at 1334, 1346.
97 See Redish, supra note 25, at 761–62 (describing self-determination).
98 See infra notes 124–128 and accompanying text.
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B. Neighborhood Institutions
The purest application of the democratization agenda is neighborhoodlevel control.99 From the perspective of self-determination, neighborhoodlevel control is also the most dangerous application because it excludes
relevant voters from the process and displaces crime to nearby
neighborhoods. Adding to this, it is not even clear that neighborhood-level
control produces its purported benefit: preference maximization.
Neighborhood-level control could take two forms. The first is
neighborhood self-governance, whereby neighborhood residents create their
own criminal codes and enforcement policies through elected representatives
or popular vote. The most obvious example of neighborhood selfgovernance is an elected neighborhood council, but other proposals—such
as neighborhood-level prosecutorial elections—also fall into this category.100
The second form neighborhood-level control could take is state-level
governance tailored to certain neighborhoods, where a state legislature
makes legislative and enforcement decisions that apply uniquely to certain
neighborhoods according to the so-called will of those neighborhoods.101
As a practical matter, the second form is easier to implement because
many neighborhoods lack existing governments. 102 And even where
neighborhood governments do exist, they are presently unfit to democratize
criminal law. For example, Los Angeles, which boasts an extensive array of
neighborhood councils, is one of the rare exceptions to the lack of
neighborhood governments throughout the country. Supporters praise the
city’s neighborhood-council system because it aims to increase minority

99

See STUNTZ, supra note 46, at 6–8 (arguing that urban neighborhoods must take back control over
criminal justice decision-making in order for “criminal justice . . . to grow more just”). But a
neighborhood, like a community, is inherently difficult to define. The term describes many things in the
English language, including groups of houses, the area surrounding a local institution like a church, or
political wards and precincts. What Is a Neighborhood?, DATA CTR., https://www.datacenterresearch.org/
data-resources/neighborhood-data/what-is-a-neighborhood/ [https://perma.cc/EAN3-JBCE]. This Note
uses the term “neighborhood” to refer to subsections of a city that are formally recognized by a city
government as “neighborhoods” in a political or social context. See, e.g., Chicago Ward, Community
Area and Neighborhood Maps, CITY OF CHI., https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/dgs/supp_info/
citywide_maps.html [https://perma.cc/C3VC-XDH9] (showing neighborhoods recognized by the
Chicago Office of Tourism). But just as political and social boundaries can change, so too can
neighborhood names and boundaries.
100 See Kleinfeld et al., supra note 11, at 1697–1705 (listing reforms).
101 See, e.g., Ouziel, supra note 67, at 2323 (proposing state criminal laws that apply uniquely to
certain cities).
102 See Janszky, supra note 23, at 1337 (“Many neighborhoods (especially in big cities), for instance,
do not have any political institutions governing them.”).
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participation, although the councils have had mixed success in practice.103
But even Los Angeles’s neighborhood councils are “advisory-only”
institutions, meaning they lack the ability to make law—instead, they craft
ordinances subject to the approval of the mayor.104 Because neighborhood
governments are rare and the few that do exist lack criminal lawmaking
powers, if criminal law does move toward neighborhood control, decisions
will likely continue to be made at the state or city level by virtue of inertia.
This presents serious risks for self-determination because state- or city-level
governance that applies uniquely to certain neighborhoods is also the most
dangerous iteration of neighborhood control from a representational and
accountability perspective.105
The following three Sections assess the first form of neighborhood
control, neighborhood self-governance, against the self-determination
factors: preference maximization, inclusion, and displacement. The fourth
Section then turns to the second form of neighborhood-level control, stateor city-level governance tailored to specific neighborhoods, which carries
risks distinct from neighborhood governments.
1. Preference Maximization
Professor Rappaport identified a key premise of the democratization
movement: people live in homogenous communities that have distinct and
identifiable views of criminal justice. 106 If this were true, neighborhood
103 See Erwin Chemerinsky & Sam Kleiner, Federalism from the Neighborhood Up: Los Angeles’s
Neighborhood Councils, Minority Representation, and Democratic Legitimacy, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 569, 577 (2014) (describing the key advantage of the councils as “their ability to bring traditionally
under-represented communities into the political process”). But in practice, the council system has had
mixed success in increasing minority participation. See Douglas Houston & Paul M. Ong, Determinants
of Voter Participation in Neighborhood Council Elections, 41 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q.
686, 688–99 (2012) (finding that Asian Americans and Latinos participate in the councils at lower levels
than non-Hispanic whites and African Americans). In addition, extremely local governments, like Los
Angeles’s city councils, come with dangers of their own. See Elliot Louthen, Note, Prerogative and
Legislator Vetoes, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 589–91 (2020) (describing Los Angeles council members’
use of a hyperlocal “legislator veto” to block affordable housing developments in their districts). Besides
neighborhood councils, there are some other existing microlocal governance structures, like businessimprovement districts or school boards, but none exist for the purpose of making decisions about criminal
law. See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1336–49 (2014) (describing two types
of “micro-local” structures: school districts and historic districts); Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal
Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 509–21 (1997) (describing four types of
economically focused “sublocal” structures: enterprise zones, tax increment finance districts, special
zoning districts, and business-improvement districts).
104 See Chemerinsky & Kleiner, supra note 103, at 574 (explaining that the councils can only advise
the city and therefore have a limited role in formal decision-making).
105 See infra Section II.B.4.
106 Rappaport, supra note 16, at 739 (discussing how democratizers presume “that Americans reside
in reasonably cohesive communities that are capable of forming and expressing . . . ‘community values’
and ‘community views’ of justice”).
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governments would maximize preferences.107 Yet there is little evidence that
this level of agreement exists at the neighborhood level. For example,
neighborhoods today are more racially heterogeneous than the democratizers
acknowledge. Racial segregation, while still high, is sharply lessening. 108
The democratizers’ idea of protecting minorities by empowering the innercity neighborhoods they live in109 does not reflect reality. As of 2016, 52%
of Black Americans in the country’s largest metropolitan areas live in the
surrounding suburbs of those areas.110 In fact, only 42% of Black Americans
live in majority-Black neighborhoods as of 2016. 111 And even racially
homogenous neighborhood residents possess divergent interests according
to class and age.112 Whatever a community is today, it is not necessarily a
neighborhood.113
Some democratizers point to a body of research that has found “a high
degree of agreement about judgments of justice across all demographics,” at
least for “the core of wrongdoing.”114 But as Professor Rappaport pointed
out, there are two significant problems with this finding. First, the finding
overstates the degree of lay consensus on criminal justice issues because it
only shows that people uniformly oppose the very worst crimes, such as
murder or rape, but not that people agree on what kind of behavior constitutes
these crimes.115 Second, although the research finds that people agree on how
severely offenses should be punished in a relative sense—in ranking offenses
107 See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) (“Decentralization allows local bodies to tailor services, regulation,
and taxation to the needs and desires of their particular constituents . . . . [L]ocal autonomy can increase
the ability of government to respond to those preferences.”).
108 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI L. REV.
1329, 1343–48 (2016) (surveying evidence on racial segregation).
109 See, e.g., Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 3 UTAH L.
REV. 543, 566 (2014) (“A democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law . . . prioritiz[es] the
empowerment of low-income and minority individuals and communities to participate more fully in the
formation and implementation of criminal justice policies.”).
110 Alana Semuels, No, Most Black People Don’t Live in Poverty—or Inner Cities, ATLANTIC (Oct.
12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/trump-african-american-inner-city/
503744/ [https://perma.cc/YDE3-84KH].
111 Paul Jargowsky, Are Minority Neighborhoods a Disaster?, CENTURY FOUND., (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/minority-neighborhoods-disaster [https://perma.cc/F6AT-YCE5].
112 See Rappaport, supra note 16, at 745–47.
113 See supra Section I.B (discussing the difficulty in defining “community”); see also STEVE
HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY 12 (2006) (finding
that “many people do not understand community as spatially bounded; urban residents often seek
community outside their neighborhood”).
114 Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility, and the Challenge of Social
Change, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1565, 1567 (2017) (reviewing the literature on community views of criminal
justice).
115 Rappaport, supra note 16, at 743–44.
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in order of severity—it does not find that they agree on the absolute level of
punishment that should accompany each offense.116
There is also a third problem: even if we accept the research as true, it
would not support localization. The researchers argue there is a consensus
among people “across all demographics” without accounting for
geography.117 But if people share similar views on criminal justice no matter
where they live, then localized control would not better represent them
because people already share similar views at the state or federal level. For
example, if 60% of voters in a state support a reform measure and 60% of
voters within a particular neighborhood support that same measure,
neighborhood-level governance would not better maximize voter
preferences as compared to state-level governance. Lessening the size of
government will logically only maximize preferences when the smaller units
of a larger body have distinct views from the aggregate views of the larger
body. But, as discussed, there is little evidence of these conditions at the
neighborhood level.118 Of course, some hyperlocal areas likely exist where
people do share higher levels of agreement on criminal justice policies than
all voters within a city or state do when considered as a whole. Yet even if
preference maximization is possible in some instances of neighborhoodlevel governance, the other two factors measuring self-determination—
inclusion and displacement or diffusion—counsel against neighborhood
governance.
2. Inclusion
Although neighborhood-level governance may appear closer to
voters, 119 it is both overinclusive and underinclusive. Drawing boundary
lines around neighborhoods would both exclude from the political process
nonresidents with an interest in a locality’s criminal lawmaking and
enforcement decisions and include residents without an interest in such
decisions.
In the United Sates, a person’s ability to vote and run for office in a
jurisdiction often depends on her residency in that jurisdiction.120 The people
116

Id.
See Robinson, supra note 114, at 1567.
118 I have found no research showing these conditions at the neighborhood level. But ample evidence
of these conditions exists at the intermediate level. See infra Part III (describing intermediate institutions).
119
See Schleicher, supra note 20, at 763.
120 See Eugene D. Mazo, Residency and Democracy: Durational Residency Requirements from the
Framers to the Present, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 611, 632 (2016) (“Most states impose durational residency
requirements on both voters and political candidates, but the individuals affected, the period of duration
required, and the justifications given for each of these distinct durational residency requirements differ
117
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who vote for and serve on a neighborhood council would thus be residents
of that neighborhood. But a residency requirement on such a small scale is
based on an anachronistic premise. We no longer live in colonial villages
where we can hop from the general store, skip to the tavern, and jump
home.121 Instead, people today work, live, and socialize across many small
areas that they are not necessarily residents in.122 So while neighborhood
governments are closer to the people, they are not necessarily closer to the
people they should be representing.
Neighborhood-level voting is both overinclusive and underinclusive.
Imagine two people: one resident of a neighborhood and one nonresident.
The resident is a student who spends all her time in another jurisdiction but
still lists her parents’ address in the neighborhood as her voting address.123
The nonresident works, shops, and socializes in the neighborhood but cannot
afford to live in it. Why should the resident—but not the nonresident—have
a say in the neighborhood’s criminal justice policies? In fact, we would
expect a mirror image of such a result in a representational democracy.
Neighborhood governance presents a political process that represents us in
some parts of our lives, namely where we reside, but not others, undermining
a core premise of both representational democracy and the democratization
movement: people should have a say in the normative policy choices that
affect them. Issues with inclusion can of course arise even when
jurisdictional boundaries are larger because some people will inevitably live
near borders and spend time in multiple jurisdictions, but as explained in
significantly.”); see also Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978) (holding that
voting may be restricted to residents of a locality); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI.
L. REV. 253, 319–20 (1993) (“Local government law . . . gives priority to a single place-bite within the
metropolitan area: the place where people live. Indeed, residency has always been at the center of local
government law’s conception of people’s relationship to the space around them.”). Some scholars,
however, have suggested voting schemes not based on residency requirements. See, e.g., id. at 329
(proposing a system that gives each person five votes to use in “whatever local elections they feel affect
their interest”); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1909 (1994) (proposing that we give all residents of a city or state the ability
to vote in all local elections).
121 See Frug, supra note 120, at 320 (conceding that “[p]erhaps this emphasis on residency was
justifiable when . . . home, work, family, friends, [and] market” were all in one community).
122 Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 421 (2001) (“[P]eople . . .
conduct their lives across various political and social communities everyday, working in one, playing in
another, going to school in another, sleeping in another, and voting in another.”). Professor Frug argues
that the residency requirement “romanticizes the home as a haven in a heartless world.” Frug, supra note
120, at 320 (citing CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED
(1977)). Because “[m]ost people spend most of their day in other parts of the region . . . . a person’s
territorial identity should not be reduced to his or her address.” Id.
123 For additional context, see Frug, supra note 120, at 320 (“But these days some people do not even
live at their place of residence: students who spend full-time out-of-state, people who are serving in the
military, and business-people who are assigned abroad are all residents of the town they are never in.”).
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Section III.B, inclusion problems are more likely to arise in a smaller
jurisdiction.
3. Displacement and Diffusion
Since criminal law is not static, localized jurisdictions also present
another set of problems. One neighborhood’s approach to criminal law can
affect—through displacement and diffusion—crime in nearby
neighborhoods.124 As Professor Rappaport put it, “The democratizers’ vision
of . . . America . . . ignores the critical ways in which neighborhoods
themselves are interconnected.” 125 This interconnectedness creates two
related problems.
First, as previously discussed in Section II.A, displacement and
diffusion conflict with self-determination. Imagine Neighborhood A votes to
increase criminal penalties for robbery, which displaces robbery crime to
Neighborhood B. The residents of Neighborhood A have functionally made
a policy choice for the residents of Neighborhood B, who did not choose to
accept the consequential risk of increased crime. The same criticism applies
to diffusion, even though diffusion reduces crime in nearby neighborhoods.
If Neighborhood A enacts harsher penalties that diffuse crime away from
Neighborhood B, it still impinges upon the ability of Neighborhood B’s
residents to calibrate their own criminal justice policies because
Neighborhood B’s residents did not participate in the democratic process that
led to the decision causing such an effect.126 Imagine those in Neighborhood
B wish to take a reformist approach and rehabilitate offenders in their
neighborhood, rather than locking them up. Maybe they want to take a step
back from the War on Drugs and break the unjust cycle of mass
incarceration.127 Neighborhood B can still formally enact its own policies,
but it does so against a landscape largely determined by another
jurisdiction—especially if Neighborhood A is imprisoning Neighborhood
B’s own residents for crimes committed while visiting Neighborhood A.128
What may seem like a windfall for Neighborhood B from the perspective of
crime control is not a windfall from the perspective of many of the other

124

See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text.
Rappaport, supra note 16, at 757.
126 Schragger, supra note 122, at 444–45 (“The spillover effects of local decisions undermine
localism not because those outsiders who are affected have not contracted into the norms . . . but because
[they] have not been included in the democratic process that preceded adoption of those norms.”).
127 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 2–9 (2010) (describing how mass incarceration leads to a system of racialized social
control similar to that of the Jim Crow era).
128 See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing inclusion).
125
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considerations voters take into account when calibrating a criminal justice
regime.
Relatedly, democratizers argue that a jurisdiction should internalize the
financial costs of its criminal policies. 129 This idea acts as a check on
jurisdictions by preventing them from instituting policies that they
themselves would not want to pay for. But why stop at monetary costs? If
the goal is to prevent negative externalities, then a jurisdiction should also
internalize the practical costs of its criminal policies. When Neighborhood
A enacts harsher criminal laws and enforcement policies, it shifts the
practical cost of these policies—displaced crime—to Neighborhood B. But
displacement is seemingly incompatible with cost internalization because
displacement shifts costs outside of a jurisdiction by nature, so there is a
tension in advocating for both neighborhood governance and cost
internalization.
Second, displacement could lead to a “race to the bottom,” in which
neighborhoods perpetually raise their criminal penalties in fear of becoming
the most crime-friendly area. 130 In the above robbery hypothetical,
Neighborhood B could respond by raising its own penalties to the same level
as or higher than Neighborhood A. But this approach risks creating “an arms
race between local communities attempting to drive crime to their
neighbors.” 131 After Neighborhood B responds with harsher penalties to
reduce the newly increased rates of robbery, the crime flows back into
Neighborhood A. Then Neighborhood A responds with even harsher
sanctions, and so on. Crucially, the protectionist mentalities of the two
neighborhoods may lead to much harsher criminal justice policies than the
residents of each locality may have chosen absent the risk of displacement.
And while the residents in this scenario are still determining what they want,
they are only doing so to preempt the threat of another locality determining
it for them. Instead of creating criminal laws based on their own values, the
residents of both neighborhoods are driven by a fear of losing an arms race
with the other.
Admittedly, displacement and diffusion can occur even when criminal
law is made on a larger scale. There is even some evidence of displacement
occurring on a statewide level,132 and the policies of areas near borders will

See, e.g., Kleinfeld et al., supra note 11, at 1705 (proposing “[c]ost [i]nternalization,” where
“[t]he county or other political unit with the authority to decide whether and how to prosecute or sentence
an individual should also bear the financial costs of prosecuting or carrying out the sentence, subject to
safeguards to correct for resource disparities among communities” (emphasis omitted)).
130 Teichman, supra note 90, at 1834, 1859.
131 Id. at 1834.
132 Id. at 1848–49 (describing how Oklahoma drug laws displaced crime to neighboring states).
129
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always risk displacing crime to other jurisdictions. But there is good reason
to believe that the chances of displacement and diffusion increase as the size
of a jurisdiction decreases. Research suggests that people typically commit
offenses close to their homes.133 More to the point, a case study found that
diffusion and displacement were most evident in the areas immediately
adjacent to the jurisdiction that increased its policing or penalties, and further
analyses found that the rates decayed with increased distance. 134 Because
people seeking to commit crimes are less likely to travel great distances to
find more favorable jurisdictions, displacement and diffusion are much
greater risks at the neighborhood level than at larger levels of government.
4. Statewide or Citywide Control Tailored to Certain Neighborhoods
In addition to neighborhood governing bodies such as neighborhood
councils, neighborhood-level control could also take the form of tailored
state- or city-level governance—where a state or city creates policies that
apply only to a certain neighborhood.135 Tailored state- or city-level control
circumvents the need for neighborhood governments altogether by asking
the existing state legislature, city council, governor, or mayor to make law
and enforcement decisions according to the will of each neighborhood. This
option may even guard against some risks created by neighborhood
governments. A state legislator, for example, is better positioned to consider
the risk of displacement and diffusion because they also represent
surrounding neighborhoods. That said, tailored state- or city-level
governance is not a viable alternative to neighborhood self-governance—in
fact, tailored control is the least democratic means of neighborhood
governance. Tailored control creates three interrelated issues: there is a lack
of true representation, the state or city policies are imbued with a false sense
of legitimacy, and neighborhood voters lack a political remedy. Taken
together, these issues illustrate how the will of the neighborhood is elusive
and difficult for state or city actors to ascertain.
First, the neighborhood views conveyed to the state legislature will not
necessarily be representative of actual neighborhood views. Tailored control
133 Wim Bernasco & Paul Nieuwbeerta, How Do Residential Burglars Select Target Areas? A New
Approach to the Analysis of Criminal Location Choice, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 296, 310 (2005). This
research further corroborates several empirical studies which “found that the likelihood of an offender’s
choosing a particular target decreases with the distance of the target from his home.” Id. at 299.
134 Shane D. Johnson, Kate J. Bowers, Chris Young & Alex F.G. Hirschfield, Uncovering the True
Picture: Evaluating Crime Reduction Initiatives Using Disaggregate Crime Data, CRIME PREVENTION
& COMM. SAFETY 7, 7–16 (2001).
135 Professor Ouziel proposed a similar arrangement, in which state legislatures would craft laws
tailored to cities. Ouziel, supra note 67, at 2323. Because of the impracticality of neighborhood selfgovernance, state- or city-level governance tailored to neighborhoods is one alternate avenue that
neighborhood-level democratization might take.
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requires a state or city legislature to, in some way, ask the neighborhood what
it desires. But the tavern owner has different interests from the priest; the
homeowner from the homeless person; the senior citizen from the
teenager.136 Tailored control creates an ambassador problem—who speaks
for the neighborhood?
The most obvious solution to the ambassador problem is town halls
because they provide a theoretically open forum for neighborhood residents
to communicate their needs to state-level representatives. Unfortunately,
town halls have two big problems: they amplify the loudest voices in the
room, and already-dominant groups disproportionately participate in them.137
These two problems are well documented in community policing literature138
and were further explored in a recent study on neighborhood zoning boards.
Researchers found that residents who are older, male, long-term residents, or
homeowners tend to participate more in neighborhood zoning boards than
other groups. 139 This “participatory bias” then translates into a greater
opportunity to influence government officials. 140 Town halls on criminal
justice run the risk of relaying similarly unrepresentative messages to
legislatures.
Another possible solution to the ambassador problem is something
democratizers have already suggested: a citizen advisory board.
Democratizers envision advisory committees that “include a diverse mixture
of lay citizens . . . [and] community leaders,” who would “aid legislatures in
the process of crafting substantive and procedural criminal law.”141 But given
the array of divergent interests in a neighborhood, could we ensure that these
boards are appropriately representative?142 Assuming the ambassadors are
picked at random, there is no guarantee that they would be representative. Of
course, if a statistically significant number of ambassadors were picked at
random, we could be fairly confident that the results would be representative.
But a state would probably not run hundreds of trials for a citizen advisory
136 See Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 1082 (“Property owners, tenants, shopkeepers, senior citizens,
teenagers, and the homeless have divergent interests,” so “[w]ho speaks for this ‘community?’”).
137 See Rappaport, supra note 16, at 749–50 (“In short, participatory democracy will always favor
those who have the time and wherewithal to participate, and the human capital to dominate.”).
138 See, e.g., HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 146 (1977) (“[P]ersons representing
special interests, such as the business community, become the strongest voices through the default of
others.”); WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 107–09 (1990) (finding that white people and property owners were more
likely to participate in community policing programs).
139 Katherine Levine Einstein, Maxwell Palmer & David M. Glick, Who Participates in Local
Government? Evidence from Meeting Minutes, 17 PERSPS. ON POL. 28, 33–34 (2019).
140 Id. at 37–39.
141 Kleinfeld et al., supra note 11, at 1699.
142 See Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 1082.
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board for practical and financial reasons. Alternatively, if the ambassadorial
positions were voluntary, citizen advisory boards would suffer from the same
problem as town halls: those who can and want to participate likely hold
views that are not representative of the neighborhood at large.143 To be sure,
it is possible for a state to accurately discern what a neighborhood wants
without using ambassadors. The state could, for instance, conduct reliable
polling or simply guess correctly. Even in those unlikely events, tailored
state- or city-level governance is still inherently flawed because of the issues
of false legitimacy and the lack of a political remedy.
Second, town halls or citizen advisory boards could attach undue
legitimacy to the laws or enforcement decisions they produce. Although
these laws or decisions are likely to be unrepresentative, as explained above,
some courts and scholars argue that laws made according to a
neighborhood’s will deserve increased deference.144 Recall that Professors
Kahan and Meares argue that the Supreme Court should have granted
deference to a city ordinance in Chicago v. Morales because it was supported
by Black local leaders and community organizations.145 Theirs is only one
side of the story. As Professors Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer
note, the ordinance was far from unanimously endorsed by the city’s Black
community. The ordinance was drafted by white aldermen, was denounced
by both Chicago’s leading Black newspaper and its NAACP chapter, and
saw more Black aldermen vote against it than for it.146 State- or city-level
decisions tailored to particular neighborhoods may masquerade as legitimate
exercises of the will of those neighborhoods, regardless of whether they
actually are, which threatens to provide these decisions with an undeserved
layer of protection in courts.
Third, the false legitimacy accompanying tailored governance would
also decrease the likelihood of a political remedy for erroneous decisions.
Under ordinary voting conditions, if a legislature passes a law based on an
inaccurate understanding of its constituents’ preferences—possibly because
of an unrepresentative town hall or advisory board—then voters have a
remedy available: they can communicate their true preferences at the voting
143

See supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text.
See Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
133, 169 (2017) (“Courts typically defer widely to local enactments, particularly on matters relating to
land use or school control, on the grounds that such decisions embody the collective will of the
community.”).
145 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
146 Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights: A
Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 217–20; see also Dorothy E.
Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 822–26 (1999) (surveying the conflicting community opinions).
144
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booth through the candidates they choose. But suppose that, because of a
believed neighborhood preference, a state legislature enacts a law that only
applies to a certain neighborhood. 147 Those community members can no
longer respond by voting out the representatives who enacted the law
because they lack the voting power to do so. Even though the law applies
uniquely to their community, the neighborhood’s voters make up only a tiny
fraction of the statewide voting population.
Such a situation parallels a phenomenon that election law scholars call
“lockup,” in which political structures make it difficult for voters to change
the status quo despite popular support for the change.148 The classic example
is when incumbents entrench themselves in office by gerrymandering their
districts to give themselves a safe majority. What was before a 51%–49%
district in favor of the incumbent becomes a 90%–10% district. If the 10%
oppose the gerrymander, no political remedy is available to them because
they no longer hold the voting power to remove the incumbent in favor of a
representative who will redraw the map back to its pre-gerrymandered
state.149 State- or city-level governance tailored to neighborhoods entrenches
laws similarly to how gerrymandering entrenches politicians because
neighborhood voters do not have enough voting power on a statewide level
to elect or pressure representatives to change the law.
The only avenue for a political remedy is if the rest of a state’s voters
know that the law at issue is unrepresentative of the neighborhood that the
law affects and help the disenfranchised neighborhood by voting for
candidates who will repeal the law. But statewide voters are unlikely to know
whether a law is representative of a neighborhood. They may not know that
the law exists in the first place and, if they do, the law may enjoy a false
sense of legitimacy unless voters know that town halls, advisory committees,
and other methods of assessing a neighborhood’s views are susceptible to
misinterpretation. Not to mention that even assuming statewide voters know
all this, they may still prioritize other interests.
Even if the state correctly interpreted the will of the community when
it enacted the law, the political process effectively locks a neighborhood into
147

The same effect would occur if a city enacted a law applicable only to a certain neighborhood.
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648–49 (1998) (first identifying and defining political lockup); see also
Jarret A. Zafran, Note, Referees of Republicanism: How the Guarantee Clause Can Address State
Political Lockup, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1418, 1421 (2016) (“Lockup describes a system where the rules and
structures of politics have made changing the status quo more difficult than it should be considering
majoritarian preferences.”).
149 For an argument that the courts should play a greater role when the political process is unable to
provide a remedy for gerrymandering, see Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 567, 572 (1946) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
148
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that choice. If the neighborhood’s voters change their mind in the future, they
lack the voting power to convince a state legislature to overturn or modify
the law. When neighborhood-specific law is made on a statewide or citywide
level, policymakers get one bite at the apple. After that, political lockup
makes a remedy unlikely. Worse yet, policymakers must often take that bite
with their eyes closed because of the dubious nature of town halls and
advisory boards.
C. State or Federal Institutions
Given that neighborhood governance is not viable, we turn next to the
status quo: state or federal governance. Unfortunately, this too is plagued by
representational issues. To be sure, state and federal institutions score better
than neighborhood institutions on the second and third factors—inclusion
and displacement. Because state and federal jurisdictions are larger and
contain fewer borders than a nation full of neighborhood-level institutions,
the risks of underincluding relevant voters and displacing crime decrease—
there are simply fewer adjacent areas to displace crime into and fewer worthy
voters to exclude.150 But state or federal governance brings its own baggage
when it comes to preference maximization. Owing to a sharp rural–urban
political divide in the United States, such large jurisdictions do not maximize
voters’ criminal-justice-policy preferences. 151 So while neighborhood
governance suffers from jurisdictions that are too small, state or federal
governance suffers from jurisdictions that are too large.
A centralized jurisdiction, such as a state or nation, must represent a
wide array of voters, so it struggles to capture the diverse needs of each
smaller community included within it. This is even truer in the United States
today because of a large rural–urban divide in which the views of people in
rural areas differ sharply from the views of people in urban areas. There is
almost a perfect correlation between an area’s population density, or how
urban it is, and its political affiliation.152 Unsurprisingly, urban areas tend to

150 State- or federal-level institutions do, however, run the risk of overincluding voters. See infra
notes 187–189 and accompanying text.
151 See Scharff, supra note 87, at 1491–93 (emphasizing that decentralization obviates the concern
“that rural state legislators are voting on policies that affect urban residents and urban state legislators are
voting on policies that affect rural residents”).
152 Stahl, supra note 144, at 139; Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1—the Urban
Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287, 292–97 (2016) (describing the
rural–urban divide and noting that “density of an area’s population is an extraordinary predictor of which
way it will vote in a presidential election”); see also BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING
OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 202–05 (2008) (describing the relationship between
political affiliation and population density during George W. Bush’s presidential campaigns); Richard
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be more liberal, while rural areas tend to be more conservative.153 What is
more, the rural–urban divide might even extend beyond the ballot box.
According to some scholars, political parties represent not only political
views but also cultural norms. Professors Christopher Achen and Larry
Bartels, for example, “argue that parties are all-encompassing social groups,”
not just collections of people with common political views. 154 Another
scholar “similarly argues that today’s partisan divisions represent competing
lifestyles with . . . mutually opposed . . . cultures, beliefs, interests, politics,
and geography.”155
Can we infer from this division of political views a comparable rural–
urban divide on criminal justice reform? The data suggest we can. True, there
is some agreement among Republicans and Democrats on criminal justice
issues, such as reducing the prison population. 156 But even on this fairly
Florida, America’s Class-Divided Electorate, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Oct. 27, 2016, 11:52 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/what-divides-clinton-and-trump-voters-classand-culture [https://perma.cc/W6QT-ASEE] (describing the relationship between political affiliation and
population density during Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaigns); Alan Greenblatt,
Beyond North Carolina’s LGBT Battle: States’ War on Cities, GOVERNING (Mar. 23, 2016), https://
www.governing.com/archive/gov-states-cities-preemption-laws.html [https://perma.cc/A22Y-4XMR]
(“[T]raditional regional rivalries almost perfectly align with partisan divisions.”).
153 Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure,
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1262–65 (2014) (discussing the left-leaning preferences of big-city residents);
Jonathan A. Rodden, The Long Shadow of the Industrial Revolution: Political Geography and the
Representation of the Left 60 (Mar. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://web.stanford.edu/
~jrodden/wp/shadow.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V4D-YXEQ] (finding that “a relatively tight correlation
between population density and left voting is quite ubiquitous in industrialized societies” and tracing the
pattern back to residential behaviors during the Industrial Revolution); BISHOP, supra note 152, at 202–
05 (discussing the rural trend toward conservatism). Consider, for example, the rising Democratic support
in cities and suburban areas that helped Democrats flip Georgia in the 2020 general presidential election
and senatorial runoff elections. See Jan Nijman, Georgia’s Political Shift: A Tale of Urban and Suburban
Change, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/202011-09/georgias-political-shift-a-tale-of-urban-and-suburban-change [https://perma.cc/J3S5-ZTX3]. This
is not to diminish the important role that many rural communities of color played in the elections. See
Jim Burress, Experts Deconstruct How Georgia’s Rural Communities of Color Delivered for Democrats
in November, Senate Runoffs, WABE (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.wabe.org/experts-deconstruct-howgeorgias-rural-communities-of-color-cemented-a-democratic-victory-in-november-senate-runoffs/
[https://perma.cc/6T7Z-7JNB].
154 Stahl, supra note 144, at 149 (citing CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS,
DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 307
(2016)). The divide even extends to how one thinks. See generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS
MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 3–4 (2012) (arguing that liberals
and conservatives have entirely different intuitions about right and wrong).
155
Stahl, supra note 144, at 149 (citing BISHOP, supra note 152, at 22–23).
156 According to a study conducted on behalf of the ACLU, “81% of Democrats, 71% of
Independents and 54% of Republicans” agree that “it is important for the country to reduce its prison
populations.” Danny Franklin, ACLU Nationwide Poll on Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU (July 15,
2015), https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-nationwide-poll-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/EJC5-
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bipartisan topic,157 there is still a 27% difference between Democrats and
Republicans.158 Even among those who agree the prison population should
be reduced, Democrats and Republicans often have different motives—such
as reducing incarceration itself versus reducing government spending. 159
Partisan division likely lies just beneath the surface of this supposedly
bipartisan topic.
Take Illinois as an example: 55% of Illinois residents agree that “[t]he
criminal justice system is biased against black people,” while 35%
disagree.160 Mapping these results against location shows that the rural–urban
divide exists on a spectrum—the farther respondents were from a city, the
less they tended to agree with the statement. The poll found 63% agreement
among Chicago residents, 60% agreement among residents of Chicago’s
suburbs, and only 42% agreement among downstate residents.161 Reflecting
on the results, Professor John Jackson noted that “race, party, and place of
residence are driving forces in shaping the voters’ views on bias in the
criminal justice system” and that “many Illinois voters live in two different
worlds when it comes to matters of race and contact with the criminal justice
system.”162 Researchers identified a similar trend, though less steep, when

EE74]; see also id. (finding that “87% of respondents agree that drug addicts and those with mental illness
should not be in prison, [and that] they belong in treatment facilities”).
157 See, e.g., First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391 (Dec. 21, 2018) (codified in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 34 U.S.C.) (reforming federal prisons and sentencing laws, among other
things). This act is recognized as a “culmination of a bi-partisan effort.” An Overview of the First Step
Act, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/overview.jsp [https://perma.cc/3PC8AXCU].
158 See Franklin, supra note 156 (conducting a nationwide poll on criminal justice reform).
159 Shaila Dewan & Carl Hulse, Republicans and Democrats Cannot Agree on Absolutely Anything.
Except This., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/prison-reform-billrepublicans-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/VLZ5-BJET]. Similarly, even Democrats and Republicans
who opposed the First Step Act of 2018 did so for diametrically opposed reasons. Republican Senator
Tom Cotton, for example, argued that the legislation would lead to increased crime by letting offenders
out of prison early. See German Lopez, The First Step Act, Explained, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019, 9:42 PM),
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/12/18/18140973/state-of-the-union-trump-first-step-actcriminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/GLU3-WVAY]. On the other hand, a number of prominent
Democrats, like Senator Dick Durbin and Congressman John Lewis, initially opposed the bill because it
did not go far enough in reforming sentencing. See Justin George, Is the “First Step Act” Real Reform?,
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 22, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/22/is-the-first-stepact-real-reform [https://perma.cc/E6SX-W65G].
160 Illinois Voters Have Strong Views on Major Issues Facing the State: Simon Poll, SIU NEWS (Mar.
19, 2018), https://news.siu.edu/2018/03/031918-simon-poll-state-issues.php [https://perma.cc/NQA65VNW] [hereinafter Illinois Voters Have Strong Views].
161 Id. The study also showed division along partisan and racial lines: 73% of Democrats agreed,
compared with only 29% of Republicans; 50% of white voters agreed, compared with 79% of Black
voters and 63% of Hispanic voters. Id.
162 Id.
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they asked voters if the state should remove barriers that make it more
difficult for previously incarcerated people to find work.163
Federal-level governance may contain an even sharper rural–urban
divide. Voting data show there are fewer moderates in heavily conservative
states, which suggests there may be an even greater disagreement on criminal
justice issues between rural residents of more conservative states and urban
residents of more liberal states than between rural and urban residents within
the same state. 164 This would make federal-level governance even less
representative than state-level governance because representatives are forced
to compromise between an even larger array of diverse interests and needs.
That said, the rise of political polarization—with parties primarily
appealing to the extremes—might render the differences between the federal
and the state levels small. Research suggests that politics is increasingly a
zero-sum game rather than an exercise in appealing to a middle ground:
political parties seek to maximize the preferences of their ideological bases,
rather than represent the preferences of the entire voting jurisdiction.
According to Professor Kenneth Stahl, both major parties have given up on
compromise “and have instead devoted their resources to achieving victory
through demography”—a fight not over the issues but over the franchise of
voting itself.165 The most notable example is the recent wave of legislation in
Republican-controlled states that makes it more difficult to vote. 166 The
upshot? Republican legislators answer almost exclusively to rural residents
and Democratic legislators answer almost exclusively to urban residents.
Each set of representatives is thus incentivized only to represent its base.167
Such a system inefficiently realizes policy preferences, since it does so only
for very particular groups. The premise of self-determination—voters have

163 The poll found that 80% of Chicago voters and 77% of suburban Chicago voters agreed, but only
71% percent of downstate voters agreed. Id.
164 Political Ideology by State (2014), PEW RSCH. CTR. (2014), https://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/compare/political-ideology/by/state/ [https://perma.cc/YQ4B-DP74] (showing that
more conservative states tend to have a greater proportion of conservative voters to moderate voters).
165 See Stahl, supra note 144, at 159–61 (noting that both Republicans and Democrats in power have
enacted voting rules that benefit their party).
166 See Ryan P. Haygood, Hurricane SCOTUS: The Hubris of Striking Our Democracy’s
Discrimination Checkpoint in Shelby County & the Resulting Thunderstorm Assault on Voting Rights,
10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S11, S35–S49 (2016) (surveying voting restrictions in Republican-controlled
states, such as polling-place closures and voter-roll purges); see also State Voting Bills Tracker 2021,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/state-voting-bills-tracker-2021 [https://perma.cc/9B84-RDY9] (finding that over 361 bills to
restrict voting access are in circulation in forty-seven states as of March 24, 2021). Democrats, on the
other hand, “have responded by attempting to expand the [voter] pool” to include people such as convicted
felons. Stahl, supra note 144, at 160.
167 See Stahl, supra note 144, at 154.
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control over policy choices that affect them—is surely offended if small sets
of voters are making policy choices on behalf of the voting pool at large.
But the rural–urban divide is not necessarily a negative feature of our
democracy. There are practical reasons why it exists. Rural and urban voters
might not just want different criminal laws but need different laws. Take gun
control as an example. As Professor Shawn Fields argues, there may be good
reasons why firearm laws should be different in rural and urban areas. 168
Rural residents use firearms for activities that are not possible in urban areas,
such as hunting and outdoor target shooting, and use different types of
firearms than urban residents.169 Most notably, rural gun owners use firearms
for self-defense in different ways from urban gun owners.170 In urban areas,
gun owners favor a concealable weapon “to provide short-term deterrence
until law enforcement can arrive.”171 But in rural areas, gun owners instead
must “supplement” traditional law enforcement in “fast-moving life-anddeath situations” because law enforcement takes longer to arrive—
something that might require more than a concealable handgun.172 So rural
residents use different firearms, in different ways, and for different reasons.
Making gun-control laws on a federal or state level, then, cannot possibly
maximize both urban and rural residents’ gun-control preferences. There are,
of course, sound reasons to have uniform gun laws—such as preventing
people from buying guns in rural areas and taking them back to urban areas—
but preference maximization is not one of those reasons.
The rural–urban divide places representation in tension with federal or
state governance. Rural and urban residents have distinct preferences,
sometimes driven by distinctly different realities. Self-determination
therefore necessitates a unit of governance smaller than federal- or state-level
institutions to more efficiently maximize policy preferences but a unit large
enough to reduce the risks of displacement and lack of inclusion.
III. INTERMEDIATE INSTITUTIONS
The drawbacks of neighborhood, state, and federal governance inform
what the democratic ideal would look like. Superior institutions would better
maximize policy preferences, encapsulate a transient populace, and prevent
displacement between jurisdictions. These institutions do, in fact, exist. This
Note defines them as “intermediate-level” institutions, which includes
168

Fields, supra note 81, at 474–76.
Id. at 474.
170 Id. at 474–75 (“[G]eographical variance informs how [the Second Amendment right to selfdefense] will be exercised.”).
171 Id. at 475.
172 Id.
169
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county and regional governments. In the urban context specifically, a
regional legislature—rather than a city or county legislature—is the most
democratically sound institution to make or enforce criminal law.
The intermediate level includes jurisdictions that are larger than a
neighborhood but smaller than a state—units such as counties, regions, or
major cities. This Part does not seek, however, to label units as intermediate
or not, but instead to define the qualities of intermediate institutions.
Classifying particular institutions as intermediate requires a case-by-case
approach because we assign similar labels to dissimilar institutions. For
example, the City of Chicago has a population of just under 2.7 million,
while the City of Vidalia has a population of just over 10,000.173 One is a
dense Midwestern urban area, while the other is located in rural south
Georgia. Even though both are cities, each area predictably has distinct
representational needs, so considering them together is unhelpful. The most
democratically sound institutions satisfy a few self-determination factors,
but depending on geography, the types of units (cities, counties, or regions)
that satisfy these factors will vary.
Importantly, no single institution represents the ideal. The intermediate
level is generally more representative than the neighborhood, state, and
federal levels. Although they are not perfect, after considering a series of
tradeoffs, intermediate institutions represent the best-fit model for
representation in criminal lawmaking and enforcement decisions. Even
choosing among intermediate institutions involves tradeoffs.
The focus of this Part is threefold. First, it explains why intermediate
institutions are a better choice than neighborhood, state, or federal
institutions. Second, it catalogues the tradeoffs made when selecting among
intermediate institutions. Finally, this Part explores how regional governance
would work in practice.
A. The Relative Appeal
From a representational perspective, intermediate-level institutions are
better suited to control criminal lawmaking and enforcement than
neighborhood, state, and federal institutions.

173
Compare QuickFacts: Chicago City, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/chicagocityillinois,US/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/
JG6E-56M6] (estimating that Chicago’s population is 2,693,976), with QuickFacts: Vidalia City,
Georgia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/vidaliacitygeorgia/
HSG495219 [https://perma.cc/C225-PQEL] (estimating that Vidalia’s population is 10,402).
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1. Versus Neighborhood-Level Institutions
Intermediate-level institutions possess two chief advantages over
neighborhood-level institutions: they are better equipped to include a
transient populace and less likely to displace crime between jurisdictions.
As to inclusion, the larger a jurisdictional boundary is drawn, the lower
the chance that residency restrictions will disenfranchise nonresidents who
deserve a voice in a jurisdiction’s criminal justice policy-making.174 Selfdetermination requires that individuals can influence the policies that affect
them, so a jurisdiction must include those who are active within its
boundaries. Data suggest that the average person’s day-to-day scope of
activity exceeds the boundaries of a neighborhood but not that of a broader
unit, such as a region. In 2017, a person’s average trip distance to or from
work in the United States was 12.2 miles.175 The average distances to the
store (7.9 miles), errands (7.9 miles), school or church (7.0 miles), and social
activities (11.4 miles) were all similar.176 Other research shows that people
embarking on trips of this length are likely to travel through more than one
neighborhood, at least in urban areas. The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention found that the average distance an urban resident travels to a food
establishment is only 2.6 miles.177 But even when urban residents travel only
2.6 miles, they reach different neighborhoods in approximately two-thirds of
those trips.178 This suggests that other daily activities with greater average
trip distances, such as going to work or school, also take people out of the
neighborhoods they live in. Intermediate-level jurisdictions encompass this
transience between neighborhoods but not at a size that would fall prey to
the preference-maximization problems posed by the rural–urban divide, such
as state- or federal-level institutions would. Placing the power to make
criminal laws with an intermediate-level legislature therefore allows people
to have a say in the criminal laws governing the areas that they spend time
in on a day-to-day basis.

174

See supra note 89 and accompanying text (describing inclusion).
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., SUMMARY OF TRAVEL TRENDS: 2017
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL SURVEY 17 (2018), https://nhts.ornl.gov/assets/2017_nhts_summary_
travel_trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H3E-5TCF]; see also ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & NATALIE HOLMES,
METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, THE GROWING DISTANCE BETWEEN PEOPLE AND JOBS IN
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 3 (2015) (finding that the average commute distance in Atlanta is 12.8 miles).
176 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 175, at 17.
177 Jodi L. Liu, Bing Han & Deborah A. Cohen, Beyond Neighborhood Food Environments: Distance
Traveled to Food Establishments in 5 US Cities, 2009–2011, PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, Aug. 2015,
at 1, 1 (finding a standard deviation of 3.7 miles).
178 Id. (measuring neighborhoods by neighborhood census tracts).
175
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As to displacement, intermediate institutions are less likely than
neighborhood institutions to displace crime by virtue of their larger size.179
Research suggests displacement is less likely to occur as jurisdictional size
increases.180 Intermediate institutions could, of course, still displace crime—
even state-level jurisdictions have been shown to do so.181 But the risk of
displacement is severely lessened between entire cities or regions, as
opposed to small neighborhoods.182
Intermediate-level governance derives its two advantages over
neighborhood governance—inclusion and displacement—largely because of
its size. This raises the question: why doesn’t state- or federal-level
governance come with the same advantage over intermediate-level
governance? As it turns out, bigger is not always better.
2. Versus State- and Federal-Level Institutions
Intermediate-level institutions are also more representative than state or
federal institutions. As to preference maximization, intermediate institutions
avoid the sharp rural–urban divide from which state and federal institutions
suffer because intermediate institutions can cover urban and rural areas with
separate governance structures.183 Recall that political affiliation and views
on criminal justice reform tightly track population density. 184 Most states
divide into three main units of density—rural, suburban, and urban—which
all have distinct viewpoints.185 Polling data on both political ideology and
criminal justice reform suggest that these views exist on a spectrum: cities
are the most left-leaning, suburbs are also left leaning but not as heavily, and
rural areas are right leaning.186 So three distinct groups exist, and two of those

179

See supra Section II.C (discussing the reduced risk of displacement at the state or federal level in
comparison to the neighborhood level).
180 See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.
181 Teichman, supra note 90, at 1848–49 (describing how Oklahoma drug laws displaced crime to
neighboring states).
182 See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text (describing the increased risk of displacement
in smaller jurisdictions).
183 For a greater discussion of the rural–urban divide and the problems it creates, see supra Section
II.C.
184 See supra notes 152–163 and accompanying text.
185 UNIV. OF CHI. HARRIS PUB. POL’Y & ASSOC. PRESS-NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFFS. RSCH., HOW
THE URBAN/RURAL POLITICAL DIVIDE PLAYS OUT IN AMERICA’S SUBURBS 4 (2019) [hereinafter UNIV.
OF CHI. HARRIS PUB. POL’Y], https://apnorc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/UChicagoHarrisAp
NorcPoll2_Final-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV7B-FKWT] (finding that 42% of rural residents are
Republicans, while 28% are Democrats; 39% of suburban residents are Republicans, while 46% are
Democrats; and 17% of urban residents are Republicans, while 58% are Democrats).
186 See id.; see also notes 148–151 and accompanying text (discussing the phenomenon of
“lockup”—when political structures entrench the status quo despite majoritarian support for change—as
applied to popular desire for criminal justice reform).

598

116:561 (2021)

Identifying the Most Democratic Institution

groups are significantly different from the third. Institutions that group all
three together, as states and nations do, are a poor fit to maximize the
preferences of all three groups. By contrast, an intermediate institution—
such as a city, county, or region—can represent a single group and thus more
easily maximize its preferences. While intermediate institutions will never
perfectly capture groups with homogenous viewpoints, they are small
enough to capture a rural or metropolitan area with greater precision,
avoiding the extreme divides that state and federal institutions capture. By
representing discrete subsets of people, which we know exist with a degree
of empirical certainty, intermediate institutions can make it so that voters are
no longer forced to settle for either an unsatisfactory compromise or a
winner-takes-all approach.
As to inclusion, intermediate institutions also capture relevant voters
with greater precision because state and federal institutions are
overinclusive. Recall that data show that people’s average trip distances are
around twelve miles and under. 187 While many people commute from
suburbs to a city, which will be addressed in more detail below,188 the data
suggest people’s daily activity is at most regional in scope, not statewide or
nationwide. For example, in surveying the distances people commute to
work in ninety-six large metropolitan areas, one study found that no area
registered a median higher than 12.8 miles.189
Although displacement might, on its face, seem to weigh in favor of
states because displacement decreases as size increases,190 research suggests
that displacement might tail off after the intermediate level. In other words,
there might not be much difference between intermediate-level displacement
and state-level displacement. Because research suggests that offenders are
less likely to commit crimes the farther they are from their routine spaces or
homes, the chances of displacement might be negligible by the time a city,
county, or regional boundary is reached.191 That said, there is no denying that
the risk of displacement is always heightened near jurisdictional borders—
and intermediate governance would create more borders than state
governance. The federal level, containing only borders with other countries,
is likely then the safest from a displacement perspective. But whether either

187

See supra notes 175–176 and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.B.2.
189 KNEEBONE & HOLMES, supra note 175, at 20–21.
190 See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text. Recall, however, that displacement does not
disappear altogether at the statewide level. See Teichman, supra note 90, at 1848–49.
191 See Johnson et al., supra note 134, at 14 (“[D]isplacement . . . would be expected to peak in . . .
adjacent areas and decay across greater distances.”).
188
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state- or federal-level governance causes meaningfully less displacement
than intermediate-level governance is less clear from existing research.
Representational self-determination in criminal law finds its sweet spot
in the middle. At either end—hyperlocal or hyperbroad—representation
scores poorly. But at the intermediate level, representational principles peak.
B. Which Intermediate Institution Is Best?
One question remains: which institution within the intermediate
category best represents voters? Again, this analysis is guided by the three
self-determination factors: preference maximization, inclusion, and
displacement. These factors—not a particular institution—should be the
starting point for any inquiry into representational democracy in criminal
law. The United States is a diverse country with geography, demographics,
and needs that vary from place to place. Applying the three factors in one
location might yield a different result than in another.
This Note does not contend that cities, counties, or regions are best able
to represent people in all circumstances—after all, even institutions with the
same name can describe vastly different places, such as the City of Chicago
and the City of Vidalia. Instead, the point of this Note is to lay out
considerations that can be applied on a case-by-case basis. Such an approach
circumvents a central problem in the democratization movement: defining a
“community.”192 Because intermediate institutions are identified on a caseby-case basis, we do not need a one-size-fits-all definition of community—
flexibility in identifying a community and its unique needs is already built
into intermediate institutions.
But there are patterns. The case-by-case analysis yields a consistent
result in metropolitan areas, where regional governance best represents
voters. In rural areas, which are less uniform, county or regional legislatures
are likely to best represent voters. This Section concludes by discussing the
practical realities of regional governance and what criminal justice reformers
can do with these findings.
1. Rural Institutions
A county or regional government will, in general, best represent voters
in rural areas.193 But because population differs widely from place to place in
192

See supra Section I.B.
In accordance with the U.S. Census, this Note considers rural areas to have a population of less
than 50,000. See Defining Rural Population, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/
rural-health/about-us/definition/index.html#:~:text=Under%20this%20definition%2C%20about%2021,
is%20still%20classified%20as%20rural [https://perma.cc/WA5G-VMPN] (describing rural areas as
those with fewer than 50,000 people and those which do not qualify as an urban cluster with between
2,500 and 50,000 people in a concentrated area).
193

600

116:561 (2021)

Identifying the Most Democratic Institution

rural America, a uniform solution is both unlikely and undesirable. Instead,
we must use a more flexible approach to best represent rural voters,
especially when homogenous groups exist across county lines.
As a starting point, rural institutions should not be treated coequally
with urban institutions bearing the same name—or even with other rural
institutions bearing the same name. For example, the urban neighborhood of
Hyde Park in Chicago has more than twice as many residents as the rural
City of Vidalia, despite the fact Hyde Park is formally a smaller unit of
governance.194 There are also important differences between rural and urban
areas beyond population. Rural cities and towns are often geographically
larger than urban neighborhoods, which means they often do not possess the
same level of risk of underinclusion or displacement as an urban
neighborhood with the same number of residents.195
Next, although the choice should depend on the unique factors of each
rural area, counties are a reasonable place to begin the inquiry. Most rural
counties feature a population with high levels of agreement, allowing county
governance to maximize preferences, and an area large enough to reduce
displacement.196 As to inclusion, according to census data, “30% of rural
residents commute 30 minutes one way to work and 4% travel as much as
90 minutes.”197 These data seem to suggest that rural people’s daily scope of
activity exists largely within one county. So according to the selfdetermination factors, county-level governance is likely a good fit in many
rural areas.
But we need not stop there. Perhaps a political jurisdiction that does not
currently exist would represent voters even more efficiently. Indeed, some
rural areas might warrant an outside-the-box solution. Imagine a large,
politically homogenous group of people that is evenly distributed among two
adjacent counties, where either county’s jurisdiction standing alone would

194
Compare UNIV. OF CHI. MED., COMMUNITY PROFILE: HYDE PARK 1 (2019),
https://www.uchicagomedicine.org/-/media/pdfs/adult-pdfs/community/chna-community-profiles/hydepark-community-profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y7V-WMTN] (estimating that Hyde Park’s population is
26,573), with QuickFacts: Vidalia City, Georgia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/vidaliacitygeorgia/HSG495219 [https://perma.cc/J6CT-25MK] (estimating that
Vidalia’s population is 10,402 as of 2019).
195 See supra Sections II.B.2–II.B.3 (describing the inclusion and displacement risks in urban
neighborhoods).
196 See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text (describing the high levels of political agreement
in rural areas); see also supra notes 190–192 and accompanying text (describing the reduced risk of
displacement as jurisdictional size increases).
197 See Opinion, Getting from Here to There in Rural America—Solutions for the Carless,
APOLITICAL (Dec. 12, 2018), https://apolitical.co/solution-articles/en/getting-from-here-to-there-in-ruralamerica-solutions-for-the-carless [https://perma.cc/W4VK-BWEX].
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insufficiently represent the group according to the three factors. Here, the
best possible jurisdiction is a regional one.198
How, then, should we decide when to use county governance and when
to use regional governance in rural areas? To decide between the two, states
must poll rural areas or make use of data already available in resources such
as the census.199 Rural areas are presently difficult to represent only because
without area-specific data, it is difficult to predict ex ante how best to
represent each area—more data on an area’s criminal justice preferences,
general scope of activity, and displacement will make the choice easier as
states make these case-by-case determinations. Of course, collecting these
data would create financial costs. But costs that drastically improve the
efficacy of our democratic system are worth bearing. After all, if our system
does not adequately represent voters on an issue as critical as criminal justice
reform, then it is not much of a democratic system at all.
2. The Urban–Suburban Problem: Toward a Regional Government
In metropolitan areas, instead of city or county governments, regional
governments are best equipped to represent voters. In line with previous
scholarship, a region is defined as a jurisdiction that covers a metropolitan
area,200 which is an area containing a large population nucleus—a city of
50,000 or more people—“with adjacent communities having a high degree
of economic and social integration with that” nucleus.201 In other words, a
region covers a city and its suburbs. While proposals for regional

198

As shown in the next Section, a regional government is sometimes necessary to best represent
voters. See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing regional governance in metropolitan areas).
199 See MICHAEL RATCLIFFE, CHARLYNN BURD, KELLY HOLDER & ALISON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, DEFINING RURAL AT THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 3 (2016), https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/
reference/ua/Defining_Rural.pdf [https://perma.cc/58V7-R3Y7] (discussing the ways in which rural
communities are delineated in the census).
200 See Briffault, supra note 50, at 3.
201 Metropolitan and Micropolitan: About, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2020), https://www.census.gov/
programs-surveys/metro-micro/about.html [https://perma.cc/7JFX-PPSJ].
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governments are rare202 and actual regional governments are rarer,203 states
can delegate power to these institutions under their constitutional home rule
powers.204 This Section describes why regional governments are up to the
task of leading criminal justice reform, and the next Section describes what
regional governments could look like.
First, although preference maximization could weigh against regional
representation, any negative effects can be mitigated. Suburban voters create
a representational headache for regional representation—and as “perhaps the
largest single bloc of the electorate in many states,”205 they are an important
group to represent. Generally, views of suburban voters track population
density, meaning denser suburbs are more left leaning. Indeed, suburbs
closer to cities tend to vote for Democrats, while suburbs farther away from
cities tend to vote for Republicans.206 The difference in views could also vary
among metropolitan areas. In a metropolitan area like Chicago, for example,
a regional government would not maximize preferences significantly less
than the city government. Recall that in the poll discussed in Section II.C—
where voters were asked two questions about criminal justice—there was
only a 3% disagreement between urban and suburban voters.207 Other areas,
however, likely have higher levels of disagreement between their cities and
suburbs. A nationwide poll found that 39% of suburban residents are
Republicans, while 46% are Democrats, and that 17% of urban residents are

202 Briffault, supra note 50, at 6 (“Proposals for full-fledged regional governments are rare, but
regionalists regularly call for new regional processes, structures, or institutions that can identify regional
problems, formulate regional solutions, implement those solutions, and coordinate regional actions over
a wide range of policy domains.” (footnote omitted)). For examples of such proposals, see DAVID RUSK,
CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 85 (1993) (advocating for metropolitan governments as a “much better
[alternative] than trying to get multiple local governments to act like a metropolitan government” because
they have a “more lasting and stable framework for sustained, long-term action”); Thomas A. Brown,
Democratizing the American Dream: The Role of a Regional Housing Legislature in the Production of
Affordable Housing, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 599, 601 (2004) (calling for the creation of a regional
housing legislature).
203 Portland, Oregon’s Metropolitan Service District is the only elected regional government in the
United States. See What Is Metro?, OR. METRO, https://www.oregonmetro.gov/regional-leadership/whatmetro [https://perma.cc/QC2K-3WK8] (“Metro . . . bec[ame] the nation’s first directly elected regional
government.”); Carl Abbott, Metro Regional Government, OR. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Mar. 17, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/ZV3C-4J6Z] (“Metro has remained the only directly elected regional government for
any United States metropolitan area.”); see also RUSK, supra note 202, at 104 (describing the district).
The Twin Cities in Minnesota also have a regional government, although not an elected one. See Who We
Are, METRO. COUNCIL, https://metrocouncil.org/About-Us/Who-We-Are.aspx [https://perma.cc/CAV4D787].
204 See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text (describing state constitutional home rule powers).
205 Stahl, supra note 144, at 139 n.23.
206 Id.
207 See Illinois Voters Have Strong Views, supra note 160.
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Republicans, while 58% percent are Democrats. 208 And because political
affiliation is correlated with views on criminal law,209 disagreement in other
metropolitan regions may be greater than in Chicago. When a city and its
suburbs do not share high levels of agreement, a state might face a choice
between representing people only in their places of residence, with one
government for the city and one for the suburbs—which runs afoul of
inclusion but maximizes policy preferences—or representing people across
their entire daily scope of activity with a regional government—which
potentially decreases preference maximization.
These challenges to preference maximization, however, can be
mitigated with precise line drawing. The facts that population density heavily
correlates with political preferences and that suburbs closer to cities are more
liberal 210 can inform where a state draws the boundaries of regional
governments. States can also directly measure preference maximization by
polling the areas in question. Alternatively, states could allow cities and
suburbs to self-sort by giving them the choice to opt in or out of metropolitan
governments through a vote. This might result in two, or possibly more,
regional governments in a metropolitan region: one encompassing a city and
its most similar nearby suburbs and the other encompassing a city’s more
conservative and more distant suburbs.
Second, a regional government is superior to a city or county
government largely because of inclusion: regional governments best capture
the daily movements of voters in metropolitan areas. Rather than spending
their lives in one city or neighborhood, people tend to move across cities
within a region.211 Today, regions—not cities—function as labor markets,
housing markets, and customer bases.212 Modern travel data illustrate this,
showing a substantial flow of two groups of people between cities and
suburbs. The first group—traditional commuters—travel from a suburb to a
city. For example, Manhattan’s population nearly doubles in the daytime,213
See UNIV. OF CHI. HARRIS PUB. POL’Y, supra note 185, at 4.
See supra notes 156–163 and accompanying text.
210 See Stahl, supra note 144, at 139 n.23.
211 See Briffault, supra note 50, at 3 (“[P]eople . . . do not concentrate their daily lives within any
one locality but, rather, regularly move back and forth among multiple municipalities across a region.”);
see also Neal Peirce, Regionalism and Technology, 85 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 59, 59 (1996) (“[M]etropolitan
regions—‘citistates’[—]are the true cities of our time . . . .”).
212 See Briffault, supra note 50, at 3 (“[B]usinesses look to the region, rather than to the localities in
which they are located, for their suppliers, workers, and customers.”).
213 See Emily Badger, The Most Important Population Statistic that Hardly Ever Gets Talked About,
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (May 30, 2013, 2:33 PM), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2013/05/
most-important-population-statistic-hardly-ever-gets-talked-about/5747/ [https://perma.cc/6HQG-7FCP]
(reporting that, based on American Community Survey data collected between 2006 and 2010,
Manhattan’s daytime commuter-adjusted population is 3,083,102).
208
209
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Washington, D.C.’s increases by 78% percent and Boston’s by 40%.214 The
second group—reverse commuters—travel from a city to a suburb. Reverse
commuters comprise 4.8 million members of the U.S. population, according
to the Census Bureau.215 In Philadelphia, for example, over 146,000 workers
reverse commute each day.216 Because people no longer confine their lives
to one city, the inclusion factor counsels for regional representation over
municipal representation.
Inclusion also favors regional representation over county
representation. Although a county may, in some instances, capture both a
city and its suburban areas, counties cannot do so with the tailor-made
precision of regional governments. For example, Cook County covers
Chicago and some, but not all, of its suburbs.217 And Fulton County covers
part of Atlanta and some of its most populous suburbs, such as Alpharetta
and Roswell, 218 but not much of Atlanta’s eastern half or other populous
suburbs, such as Marietta.219 Unlike with counties, which were drawn before
the economic and social scope of modern life developed, we can draw
regional government lines according to the modern realities of metropolitan
populaces to include as many relevant voters as possible.
Lastly, displacement may not heavily affect the choice between a
regional government and a city or county government.220 True, regions are
by nature bigger than the cities they include, so displacement—which is
dependent mostly on size—may marginally decrease at the regional level.221

214

LYNDA LAUGHLIN, PETER MATEYKA & CHARLYNN BURD, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CHARACTERISTICS OF DAYTIME URBAN COMMUTERS FOR 20 U.S. CITIES: GENDER, WORK, AND FAMILY
4 fig.1 (2015) (displaying commuter-adjusted population change in twenty U.S. cities); see also Census
Bureau Reports 253,000 Workers Commute into Philadelphia County, Pa., Each Day, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Mar. 5, 2013), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/archives/2013-pr/cb13-r20.html [https://
perma.cc/4MF7-5V2R] (reporting that 27.4% of Philadelphia workers commute outside the county where
they live).
215 Why More People Are Commuting from Cities to Suburbs, JLL (June 25, 2018), https://
www.us.jll.com/en/trends-and-insights/cities/why-more-people-are-commuting-from-cities-to-suburbs
[https://perma.cc/X9BA-N4HJ].
216 See id.
217 See Rich Reinhold, New Standards and Geographic Definitions for Metropolitan Statistical
Areas, ILL. DEP’T OF EMP. SEC., https://www2.illinois.gov/ides/lmi/Pages/New_Standards_and_
Geographic_Definitions.aspx [https://perma.cc/HZZ8-UM9E].
218 See Fulton County Cities, FULTON CNTY., https://www.fultoncountyga.gov/inside-fultoncounty/cities-in-fulton-county [https://perma.cc/8RX3-QVN9].
219 See id.; Voting Districts Maps Viewer, FULTON CNTY., https://gismaps.fultoncountyga.gov/
portalpub/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=c9290d15d93148eab7412de12ba45629 [https://perma.cc/
8FVT-445T].
220 See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text (describing displacement).
221 See id. (describing displacement).
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But, as discussed, the effects of displacement may already be negligible by
the time jurisdictions are drawn on an intermediate level.222
On balance, a regional legislature is best positioned to represent
metropolitan voters. The second and third factors—inclusion and
displacement—favor regional institutions. Preference maximization, on the
other hand, weighs less certainly in favor of regional governance, but the
damage to preference maximization at the regional level can be mitigated
through careful line drawing or by allowing cities and suburbs to self-sort
into regional legislatures.
C. Regional Governance in Practice
In theory, regional governments are among the best suited institutions
to reform the criminal justice system, especially in metropolitan areas—but
what would they actually look like? Regional governments could take the
form of regional legislatures or regional compacts between existing city
governments. Realistically, the chances of governments adopting such
schemes might be slim. That reality does not, however, lessen the importance
of recognizing regional governments as often the most democratic
institutions to lead criminal justice reform. Instead, the reasons that regional
governments are democratically sound institutions should inform our
decisions about criminal justice reform at whatever level it takes place
because they shed light on what democratizing entails in different settings.
The first form that regional governance could take is a regional
legislature. Examples of regional governments already exist in Portland,
Oregon and the Twin Cities in Minnesota. The Portland Metropolitan
Service District (Metro), which covers Portland and twenty-three other
nearby cities, is the only elected regional government in the United States.223
Metro received a home rule charter in 1992 224 and manages the region’s
waste, growth, and parks, among other things. 225 The Twin Cities have a
similar government—albeit not an elected one—called the Metropolitan
Council. The Metropolitan Council consists of seventeen representatives,
one from each district in the region, who are appointed by the Governor of
Minnesota.226 The council establishes policies on city planning, transport,
and sewage, among other things, and it even has the power to supersede local
government laws, although it does not have the power to make criminal law

222
223
224
225
226
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See Johnson et al., supra note 191 and accompanying text.
See What Is Metro?, supra note 203 (describing Portland’s Metro).
RUSK, supra note 202, at 104.
See What Is Metro?, supra note 203.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.123 (West 2014).
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or enforcement decisions.227 Given the range of authority both these regional
governments have, it is not difficult to imagine the creation of specialized
regional governments that can make criminal law or criminal enforcement
decisions. Regional governments could consist of existing elected
representatives from major cities and the suburbs they share high levels of
agreement with or, much like Portland’s Metro, representatives elected
specifically to serve on the regional government.228
Another option is regional compacts—agreements between cities or
counties. Regional compacts already exist and, because they incorporate
existing governance structures rather than create new ones, they might be
easier to implement. Take, for example, the Southeast Florida Regional
Climate Change Compact—a compact between counties in Florida to
develop legislative programs that mitigate climate change. 229 States, too,
regularly form compacts with other states to coordinate legislation. 230
Consider Portland again. Under a regional compact, instead of forming an
elected regional government as they did, the local governments of Portland
and each of its twenty-three suburbs could simply enter into an agreement to
jointly craft and enforce criminal justice policies, such as police bodycamera requirements or use-of-force protocols. Regional compacts reach the
same result as formal regional governments—preference maximization of
likeminded metropolitan voters, inclusion of all voters active in the region,
and a decreased likelihood of displacement owing to the size of the region—
but they might be more palatable to states unwilling to change the status quo
and institute entirely new regional governance institutions. With regional
compacts, localities need only enter into agreements they can leave at any
point, and the state need not commit to full-scale institutional change.
Some might argue that regardless of institutional inertia, both
proposals—regional governments and regional compacts—are infeasible
because they would create confusion for law enforcement, who would have
to enforce multiple criminal codes. But this concern is unlikely and easily
avoidable. Police departments already operate at the city, county, and state
levels, and state police typically enforce only laws that are outside the

227

See id. § 473.129.
See What Is Metro?, supra note 203 (noting that the council consists of a president, who is elected
regionwide, and six councilors elected by district).
229 See What Is the Compact?, SE. FLA. REG’L CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT, https://
southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org/about-us/what-is-the-compact/
[https://perma.cc/6DJK-DABG]
(describing the compact).
230 See generally JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS 75–147 (2d ed. 2002) (surveying the many interstate compacts from
criminal to environmental to tax law).
228
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jurisdiction of city or county police.231 When cities or counties form regional
governments or compacts, they could take into consideration whether their
new jurisdiction maps onto existing law enforcement jurisdictions—after all,
police departments belong to the very bodies that would be part of the
regional governments or compacts. For example, if the greater Chicago area
formed a regional government, it could include entire jurisdictions—such as
the City of Chicago and the City of Evanston—that already have their own
law enforcement departments, rather than splitting cities or counties down
the middle. This is all to say that, with proper planning, regional governance
is unlikely to pose jurisdictional problems greater than those that already
exist under existing state and local governance structures.
Admittedly, instituting regional governments or compacts would
require a radical overhaul of our political structures. But before we dismiss
them, consider two points. First, should we care if criminal justice reform
requires a radical change to our political structures? The status quo, in which
voters are shoehorned into arbitrarily drawn districts, is not necessarily
desirable. And although we are used to such a system, it is not even much of
a status quo, historically speaking. 232 Professor Charles Tiebout famously
proposed the idea of “voting with your feet”: if you do not like your local
laws, you can simply move to a jurisdiction with better ones.233 As many have
pointed out, this proposal is detached from reality because people do not, and
often cannot, move on a whim.234 So let’s flip it on its head—if voters cannot
move to the right jurisdiction, move the right jurisdiction to them. A
representative democracy represents we the people, not the land on which
we live. As the way in which we live changes, our jurisdictional boundaries
might, from time to time, need to change with us. Not to mention, if regional
231 See Fraser Sherman, Difference Between a State Trooper & a Sheriff, CHRON. (June 28, 2018),
https://work.chron.com/difference-between-state-trooper-sheriff-22502.html
[https://perma.cc/9SA9V64E]; see also William A. Geller & Norval Morris, Relations Between Federal and Local Police,
15 CRIME & JUST. 231, 242 (1992) (emphasizing that police responsibilities are fragmented by
geographical jurisdiction). Some states even confine the jurisdiction of state police by law. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 35-2-32 (West 2021) (confining the primary role of state police to public roads and
highways).
232 Robert T. Ford, Law’s Territory (a History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 843 (1999)
(“[T]erritorial jurisdictions—the rigidly mapped territories within which formally defined legal powers
are exercised by formally organized governmental institutions—are relatively new . . . developments.”).
233 Schragger, supra note 53, at 1550 & n.64, 1557 (2019) (attributing the concept to Professor
Tiebout but noting that Professor Tiebout did not coin the term “voting with your feet”); see also Tiebout,
supra note 53, at 419; Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 776 (1995) (“If I dislike the laws of my home
state enough and feel tyrannized by them enough, I always can preserve my freedom by moving to a
different state with less tyrannous laws.”).
234 See e.g., Schragger, supra note 53, at 1548–51 (arguing that most firms and workers do not or
cannot move due to various constraints).
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governance is the most democratic avenue for criminal lawmaking, perhaps
future scholarship will show that it is also the most democratic institution for
other areas of law and policy, making the radical change even more
worthwhile.
Second, even without a radical change in governance structures, this
Note should be instructive to any reform contemplated at the neighborhood,
state, or federal level because it has examined the deficiencies in each. An
awareness of those deficiencies will aid lawmakers and activists in crafting
laws and enforcement policies through more democratic means. Rather than
charging into democratization with our eyes shut, we must be acutely aware
of what democratization entails in each jurisdictional setting and how
different jurisdictions affect avenues for criminal justice reform on the
ground.
CONCLUSION
The democratization of criminal justice—if calibrated at the right
level—would produce a more democratic criminal justice system than the
one we have today. But that’s a big “if.” The level of governance at which
reform takes place is critical to democracy because it mediates the amount
of representation afforded to voters in the criminal lawmaking process. As
the disregarded voices of so many cry for changes in our criminal justice
system, there is no time like the present to institute more democratic
structures to ensure that those voices are heard.235 But we must change in the
right way.
To choose the right institution to make and enforce criminal law, we
must understand the tradeoffs inherent in our decisions. Smaller institutions,
like neighborhood councils, are underinclusive and threaten to displace or
diffuse crime. Larger institutions, like state or federal governments, create
representational dilemmas because of a sharp rural–urban divide in
viewpoints. Now is the time—at least in the criminal justice sphere—to think
about capturing voter interests in an outside-the-box manner: on a regional
level. The United States is no longer comprised of residents of one state or
another, or of one neighborhood or another, but of rural residents, suburban
residents, and urban residents. These residents no longer travel short
distances by horse and carriage; they commute, shop, and socialize across
many smaller areas, all in a single day. Given this new reality, the best way
to optimize democracy in criminal law is to administer it at a regional level.

235

See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
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